An appraisal of the impact of reform on society: the case of early Tanzimat, 1839-1856 by İyiiş, Kübra & Iyiis, Kubra
  
 
AN APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF REFORM ON SOCIETY:  
THE CASE OF THE EARLY TANZIMAT, 1839-1856 
 
 
 
by  
KÜBRA İYİİŞ 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences 
in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Turkish Studies 
 
 
 
 
Sabancı University 
January 2015
  
AN APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF REFORM ON SOCIETY:  
THE CASE OF THE EARLY TANZIMAT, 1839-1856 
 
 
APPROVED BY: 
 
 
 
Yusuf Hakan Erdem        ……………………….. 
(Thesis Advisor) 
 
 
 
Selçuk Akşin Somel            ……………………….. 
 
 
 
 
Emre Hatipoğlu                   ………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATE OF APPROVAL:          05.01.2015  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Kübra İyiiş 2015 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
AN APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF REFORM ON SOCIETY:  
THE CASE OF THE EARLY TANZIMAT, 1839-1856 
 
KÜBRA İYİİŞ 
 
M.A. Thesis, January 2015 
 
Advisor: Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
 
Keywords: early Tanzimat, Muslims, non-Muslims, public opinion, spy reports 
 
The early Tanzimat era (1839-1856) constitutes an important period in Ottoman history 
studies. However, many studies were based on state-oriented analyses and do not give 
adequate attention to social history. In order to understand the era in full terms and 
within the boundaries of state-society relations, societal segments should also be 
included and carefully examined. This thesis aims to examine concerning the era from 
the lens of social history and focuses on the Ottoman public opinion formation in 
nineteenth century against the political and economic changes. Specifically, it 
investigates inter-communal relations between Muslim and non-Muslim groups over 
spy reports collected in İstanbul on 1840-1844. The first two chapters are based on the 
state level analyses and legal background in order to have concrete basis of the 
reactions. The third chapter proposes micro-political analysis for the reactions of non-
elite segments within a broader historical conjuncture of the period and investigates the 
possible causes behind the public opinion formation process in nineteenth century 
İstanbul.  
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ÖZET 
REFORMLARIN TOPLUM ETKİLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA:  
ERKEN DÖNEM TANZİMAT ÖRNEĞİ (1839-1856) 
KÜBRA İYİİŞ 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2015 
Danışman: Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
Anahtar Sözcükler: erken Tanzimat, Müslümanlar, gayrimüslimler, kamuoyu, hafiye 
raporları 
Erken Tanzimat dönemi Osmanlı tarihi çalışmalarında önemli bir yer tutmaktadır ancak, 
yapılan çalışmaların önemli bir kısmı dönemi sadece devlet odaklı incelemekte ve 
sosyal tarih kısmına yeterince önem atfetmemektedir. Dönemi devlet-toplum ilişkileri 
bağlamında bütün yönleriyle anlayabilmek için toplumsal kesimler de analize dahil 
edilmeli ve dikkatli bir biçimde incelenmelidir. Bu tez sözkonusu dönemi sosyal tarih 
açısından incelemeyi amaçlamakta ve bununla bağıntılı olarak siyasi ve ekonomik 
değişimlere yönelik olarak şekillenen ondokuzuncu yüzyıl Osmanlı toplumunun 
kamuoyu dinamiklerine odaklanmaktadır. Spesifik olarak da Müslümanlar ve 
gayrimüslimler arasındaki cemaatler arası ilişkileri 1840-1844 yılları arasında 
İstanbul’da toplanmış olan hafiye raporları üzerinden incelemektedir. Çalışmanın ilk iki 
bölümü tepkileri daha somut bir düzlemde incelemek amacıyla devlet düzeyindeki 
analizlere ve hukuki altyapıya ayrılmıştır. Son bölüm ise toplumun elit olmayan 
kesimlerinin tepkilerinin incelenmesi için tarihsel bağlam içerisinde mikro-politik bir 
inceleme önermekte ve ondokuzuncu yüzyıl İstanbul’undaki kamuoyunun 
şekillenmesinin ardında yatan potansiyel sebepleri araştırmaktadır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Who built the seven gates of Thebes? 
The books are filled with names of kings.”1 
 
When “history” was considered as a particular discipline, at least for the ones 
who do not claim to be a historian or not engaged with history to a specific extent, the 
first idea that comes to the mind would be most likely political or diplomatic history. 
What is meant by political history is the evaluation of the historical events from a 
perspective that bring out its research questions from the state level. Wars, treaties, 
meetings, declarations and many other events or documents are considered both source 
and topic of the political history. Most importantly, names are indispensible part of the 
political history. They could be politicians or they could be influential figures whose 
profession is not on politics. This is valid for almost all the societies in the world and 
does not leave Ottoman history as an exception. Within the framework of this general 
historical need, Ottoman studies require another outlook in addition to the existing 
valuable literature regarding the diplomatic history as well as other historical studies.  
The significance of the political or diplomatic history is not open to question; 
however taking a particular society’s history only through political history poses a 
problematic perception. Leaving outside the unknown names harms our understanding 
in both historical and political terms. It would block the way for understanding the full 
story and fruitful analysis that can shed a light upon the “present”. Present in here is 
particularly important regarding the history of a particular society and it has a very 
strong bond with the present. This bond is significant in the sense that knowledge 
produced by history could only be questioned on the basis of its relation with the 
present. Accordingly, it is also in a strong correspondence with politics and political 
                                                          
1
Bertold Brecht, A Worker Reads History 
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science as well.
2
 The repercussions of the past over present create the curiosity and 
research questions in academic sense for present individuals. It is also beyond the 
curiosity, it brings the accurate process of making sense of the current time and society. 
In addition, as Hobsbawm argues, being member of a society means to position yourself 
according to the past even by through negating it.
3
 While the importance of history is 
clear, a one dimensional perspective harms the accuracy in an irreversible sense since 
the discourses that shapes the perception towards issues becomes even concrete with 
repeating over and over.  Therefore, special need arises for the ones who focus on 
political and social phenomenon should also turn their attention to the society and 
“unknown people’s history”. This perception constitutes a proposal to overcome this 
drawback and it is to focus on social history. 
Recent history studies started to work on these problems and studies related to 
social, cultural and intellectual history began to emerge and gave fruitful analyses that 
widen our perspectives regarding the political events. The main genres under the social 
history studies could be categorized as demography and kinship, urban studies, classes 
and social groups, history of “mentalities” and culture, transformation of the societies 
(modernization or industrialization) together with social movements and phenomenon 
of social protest.
4
 The increasing number of studies that focuses on history of women or 
history of labor could be indicated as the signs of increasing importance of social 
history as examples together with many other spheres.  
 The characteristics of the social history, as indicated by Stearns, could be 
regarded as firstly focusing upon social groups that are out of power since “these groups 
display some capacity to change and therefore some capacity to influence wider 
historical processes”. This characteristic is particularly important in a sense that it helps 
to destroy the static understanding of societies especially for the ones who are stuck in 
the Western historical conceptualizations and undermine the perception that stipulates 
society as an homogenous entity that is mainly in line with the manipulation of the state 
except for grand and radical break-ups such as revolutions. Secondly, rather than 
focusing on pure political issues, interrelations between social functions should also be 
examined. Lastly, it approaches the history as “patterns and processes of culture, power 
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E. Attila Aytekin, "Siyaset Bilimi ve Tarih" in Siyaset Bilimi Kavramlar İdeolojiler Disiplinlerarası 
İlişkiler, ed. E. Attila Aytekin and Gökhan Atılgan (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2012), 433. 
3
 Eric Hobsbawm, On History, (New York: New Press, 1997), 10. 
4
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relationships and behavior rather than series of events”.5 It does not contradict the 
understanding of diplomatic history; rather it functions as a complementary. The 
significance of social history could be also regarded as “democratization of history” 
with these characteristics and it emphasizes the alternative paths that could be taken 
rather than implying “necessities” in a teleological manner.6 Regarding the sources 
many different tools including oral history elements could be counted.  
 The research question of this thesis rose from such concerns and aims to adopt a 
social historical perspective. It takes the nineteenth century Ottoman state and society 
within the period of early Tanzimat as its research subject. The Tanzimat era in Ottoman 
history was examined in many ways but mostly within the confines of diplomatic 
history. It was taken as a grand political change with critiques naturally. Nevertheless, 
the segment that was affected from the changes most was generally ignored: the non-
elite people. In this sense, the concepts of elite and non-elite together with their 
meaning in the Ottoman context should be clarified in order to have a more accurate 
understanding of this research. 
 The main literature that deals with elites bases their studies on a basic 
distinction: the ones who rule and the ones who are ruled. As one of the leading scholars 
of the elite theory Mosca states: 
“The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, 
monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the 
second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a 
manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, 
and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence 
and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political 
organism”.7 
According to the classical studies of the elites, it could be stated that an 
individual or a group who holds political power meaning that the ones who has the 
authority to be effective on the decision making mechanisms that affects and regulates 
the functioning of a particular society forms the ruling elite. The source of political 
power has been discussed by the political powers and several explanations that are 
outside the scope of this thesis were produced. However, the main point regarding the 
                                                          
5
 Peter N. Stearns, "Social History and History: A Progress Report." Journal of Social History 19 (1985): 
322. 
6
 Aytekin, “Siyaset Bilimi”, 435. 
7
 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939), 50. 
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description of elites in the society was formed around “the possession of force by a 
minority”.8 This minority is commonly named as elites. In addition to this basic 
distinction, the studies also indicate the relations with “the ruled” segments in terms of 
compliance or discontent as well as the legitimacy structures that enables the ruling 
class to hold on political power.  
The classical formulation of the Ottoman class structure is indicated by İnalcık 
in a similar manner through the basic distinction of the ruler and the ruled and this 
system is continuation Middle Eastern state practices. The ruler group constituted by the 
Sultan together with viziers and governors whose power was delegated from the former; 
whereas the ruled group was formed by tax-payers.
9
 The Ottoman system was 
categorized by these two groups as askeri and reaya. Reaya was not differentiated 
according to religion or territory and regarded as tax-payers while askeri class was 
exempted from taxation.
10
 
Core of the Ottoman elites were composed by different social sets rather than a 
monolithic structure. The first and foremost social set comes from the hereditary rule of 
the Ottoman sultans. Kinship based nobility, as also the case for many other societies in 
the world, composed a crucial part of the Ottoman elites. In addition, state officials or 
members of bureaucracy constituted another social set included to the elites. Contrary to 
kinship based system, joining to elite group was based on success and service to the 
state. As Mardin states, the power balance between the nobles and state officials formed 
a source of instability for the elites in themselves and it continue in the Ottoman system 
which was also seen in their ancestors Oğuzs.11 The Ottoman bureaucracy was consisted 
of different branches which were classified under the professional spheres. As Reyhan 
argues, triple-functional distinction could be made namely ilmiyye (state officials 
dealing with religious issues), seyfiyye (high level customary officials and military 
members) and kalemiyye (state officials dealing with administrative issues).
12
 Therefore, 
the Ottoman state elites were based on religious, military and administrative 
distinctions. However, the power balance between these sets was not equally separated. 
                                                          
8
 Robert E. Dowse, and John A. Hughes, Political Sociology (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 22. 
9
 Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klasik Çağ (1300-1600) (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 
74. 
10
 Ibid., p. 75 
11Şerif Mardin, "Historical Determinants of Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in 
Turkey" Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 22, no. 4 (1967): 115. 
12
Cenk Reyhan, "İlim-Kılıç-Kalem: Osmanlı Kamu Personeli Rejiminde Üçlü İşlevsel Ayrışma" 
Belleten 72, no. 263-265 (2008):120. 
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Regarding the nineteenth century as the main focus of this thesis, a new bureaucratic 
elite rose to power during the reign of Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz by arrogating itself to 
the political power that was concentrated in the hands of Selim III and Mahmud II for a 
short time.
13
  
However, considering holding power and decision-making mechanism side of 
the elite theory, it could be also argued that there were also segments of the society who 
holds power whether in political or economic terms but not directly related to the state 
as in the case of bureaucracy. When the main distinction of the ruler and the ruled is 
taken as ground rule for being part of the elites, exceptional situations should be also 
considered.
14
 An important group is ayan. This term was used for urban notables in 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whereas in eighteenth century it also denoted semi-
official brokers between the Ottoman state and society mainly through taxation issues.
15
 
The political and economic power possessed by ayans in the provinces of the Empire 
points to their position in the system in terms of social stratification. Another significant 
social set is consisted of commercial bourgeoisie and these could be regarded as part of 
the elites in economic terms. Considering the nineteenth century, thanks to the 
increasing trade with the West the Ottoman provincial notables, artisans, Janissaries, 
and foreign residents of the empire along with the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants 
gained remarkable economic wealth and generated the seeds of Ottoman commercial 
bourgeoisie.
16
 Beratlı merchants, as it will be examined following parts of this work, 
were also considered within the commercial bourgeoisie and part of the elite group 
respectively.   
 
As it can be seen in the aforementioned framework, the Ottoman elite in the 
nineteenth century composed of Palace household and state servants together with the 
political and economic actors at the provincial level. Therefore, the Ottoman subjects 
who are not a part of this framework could be taken as “non-elites”. In line with the 
theoretical description of “the Ottoman non-elite”, several questions will be taken as 
basis for this thesis in order to have a view regarding reactions of the Ottoman society. 
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 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish 
Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 109. 
14
 Mardin, "Historical Determinants”, p. 120 
15
 Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ayanlık (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1977), 22-
23. 
16
 Fatma Müge Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social 
Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 89-90.  
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How did the people who were living under Ottoman Empire react against political 
changes in the nineteenth century? What was the dynamics that shaped their opinions 
regarding the concerning issue? And specifically, how did these reactions were formed 
with respect to Muslim and non-Muslim relations? This study aims to propose answers 
to these questions acknowledging that conclusive opinions would be problematic due to 
the nature of the issue. Understanding the era in question requires an outlook in both 
political and social terms. Therefore, the organization of this thesis is based on three 
main chapters. It was argued that diplomatic history is a complementary part of an 
accurate analysis. Hence, the first chapter was reserved to the examination of political 
events of the era with a critical point of view. The historical background and political 
events creates the basis for the reactions and public opinion formation process of the 
elites. In addition, Tanzimat reforms as a part of the Ottoman modernization process 
evaluated with reference to the debates related to it. Secondly, pre-Tanzimat period will 
be examined within the legal framework. Understanding the pre-Tanzimat legal system 
with a special emphasize on Muslims and non-Muslims will provide a clearer 
perception in order to understand the reactions to changes.  
The last chapter of this study was assigned for the study of the non-elite 
reactions on the basis of Muslim and non-Muslim opinions. The data derived from the 
extensive and valuable study of Cengiz Kırlı that was based on the examination of spy 
reports collected in İstanbul between the years of 1840-1844.17 In his study, Kırlı 
brought these significant sources into the light and carried an analysis based on the 
changing political practices of administration with its relation regarding formation of 
public opinion and the perception of public visibility on the side of the Ottoman ruler. 
He argues that the extensive surveillance practices conducted with the help of spies 
(hafiye) in the nineteenth century denote the different character of the Ottoman 
administration practices in contrast to the earlier social control mechanisms. Rather than 
making a choice between the discussions of the existence and non-existence of the 
public opinion in non-Western regions and sociological analyses of the issue within the 
boundaries of development of public opinion against the state; Kırlı states that “public” 
and “public opinion” became an important part of the Ottoman state mentality after the 
second half of the nineteenth century and it should be considered within the framework 
                                                          
17Cengiz Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde "Havadis Jurnalleri" (1840-1844) 
(İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008). 
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of new political practices.
18
 He points out to the surveillance practices as constructive 
ones since it maintains tools for intervening, forming and administrating the society in 
addition to its social control function. After 1840s, the aforementioned practices were 
being conducted for leakage of the state authority to the daily life spheres of the society 
by extending itself from the traditional forms of politics for social control. As argued by 
Kırlı, the “discovery” of the public opinion by the state indicated a new political 
mentality. The spy reports were the documents that rumors turned into news and 
become a part of the political power.
19
 Acknowledging the significance of the changes 
in the state mentality and its reflections on the Ottoman society, this thesis aims to 
concentrate on the societal level thanks to the information contained in the spy reports 
revealed in Kırlı’s highly respectable work.  
The scope of this thesis is based on the reactions of the people and it specialized 
on the daily relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition, this work also 
makes an effort to understand the potential dynamics that shapes the reactions. The spy 
reports that are used as the data set instrumentalized to have more concrete arguments. 
However, it would be possible to argue the accuracy of the reports. These reports were 
collected by the state; therefore their usefulness is open to discussion. However, their 
value comes from this point. They reflect a kind of bridge between state and society that 
remarkable knowledge related to both sides could be produced. They can be considered 
as narratives to a certain extent together with its relation to Ottoman state and their 
content have crucial facets namely being chronological, meaningful and social
20
 which 
provides a highly useful source for the research question in here.  
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 Ibid., p.16-17 
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 Ibid., p.25-26 
20
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Sage Publications, 2005), 4. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE TANZİMAT ERA: THE GÜLHANE EDICT OF 1839 AND REFORM 
EDICT OF 1856 
1.1 The Gülhane Edict  
On November 3, 1839, an edict was read to the public which was consisted of 
prominent Ottoman state officials including ministers and ulema, the representatives of 
artisans and guilds, foreign diplomats and a big crowd of Ottoman population. Then, a 
ceremonial path was pursued through sacrifices, gun salutes and imperial festivities. 
More importantly, the sultan and the prominent state officials took part in an oath-
taking ceremony in which they assured that they will obey the specifications of the 
edict
21
. One of the names that were used to describe it was taken from the place where it 
was declared by Mustafa Reşid Paşa: Gülhane Park. It was published in the official 
gazette of Takvim-i Vekayi and a week later it was issued to each governor (eyalet 
valisi) and district deputies (sancak müstesellimi) expecting that each specification in 
the edict shall be immediately enforced except for the ones related to military duty and 
taxation. Another requirement that was expected to be performed by the state officials 
in the districts was the declaration of the edict to the public and to be sure that its 
specifications were understood correctly by public (ahali) and reaya
22
. The content of 
the Gülhane Edict was important in a sense that it offered different notions and ideas 
that were not common in the earlier Ottoman political system. The ceremonial, 
elaborative and determined manner of the government was also showing that it was 
taken seriously as a symbol of a new era in the Ottoman political and social life.  
                                                          
21
 Enver Ziya Karal, "Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayununda Batı’nın Etkisi" in Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, ed. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası 
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 Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri" in Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu, ed. Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları, 2008), 171. 
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Although the genre of the Gülhane Edict is open to argumentation as it can be 
seen later parts of this study, the effect of it is remarkable without leaving any further 
room for discussion. Furthermore, this effect does not only include the long-term 
influences over the history of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey but also its immediate 
effects over elite and non-elite segments of the Ottoman society were significant. This 
thesis is dedicated to the exploration of the non-elite reactions to the Gülhane Edict and 
other reforms that were undertaken afterwards in terms of Muslim and non-Muslim 
relations. However, in order to have a comprehensive outlook regarding the non-elite 
reactions its historical, legal and political context should be examined and analyzed. If 
the reactions should be analyzed accurately, first of all certain basic questions should be 
answered. What were political conditions that the edict was born in? What were the 
promises it was offering? What was its legal genre and what difference does it make? 
More importantly, what was the main motive behind the declaration of the Gülhane 
Edict? Answering these questions will provide a fruitful basis to analyzing the reactions 
of the non-elite segments of the Ottoman society.  
1.1.1 The Historical Background of the Gülhane Edict  
 
The Gülhane Edict is commonly known as “Tanzimat Fermanı” and the period 
initiated by it lasted from 1839 (the Edict) to 1876 (the declaration of constitutional 
monarchy and Kanun-i Esasi as the first Ottoman constitution) is defined as Tanzimat 
period in its most intensive form. Some authors
23
 also state that the period starts earlier 
than 1839 Gülhane Edict and extends the time period until 1908 Young Turks 
Revolution
24
. Zürcher states that it is possible to argue that the age of reforms was 
ended in 1871
25
. Although periodization is also point a of discussion that will not be a 
part of this study, it is preferable to briefly analyze the events that lead to Gülhane Edict 
will help to have an accurate perception of the Edict and the other reforms made later.  
Although it is not possible to discuss to dynamics that led to the proclamation of 
the Gülhane Edict without referring to the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II, for 
practical reasons this study will take certain events as the crucial factors through the 
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 Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, "Tanzimatta İçtimai Hayat" in Tanzimat. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. (İstanbul: Milli 
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24
 Also see Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden, Brill, 1997) for the discussion 
related to the characteristics of the Young Turk movement. 
25
 Eric Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History. 3rd ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 50. 
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way to the Edict and reforms that were undertaken later. The most significant reason is 
related to the topic that was chosen for this study in terms of Muslim and non-Muslim 
relations after the Gülhane Edict. Therefore, Serbian Rebellion in 1804, Greek War of 
Independence in 1821, Mohammad Ali Incident or Egyptian Question in 1831-1840 and 
Anglo-Ottoman Trade Agreement in 1838 will be taken as the key events.  
The independence movements in the Balkans are one of the events that had an 
effect on the public opinion of the time especially for the Muslim side. Therefore, it 
would be helpful to briefly examine these movements. It could be argued that these 
movements have started with the Serbian Revolt. However, at first, the main aim was 
not to gain independence but it was against the maladministration and the oppressive 
acts of the local Ottoman officials and the Janissaries. By 1804, the Ottoman rule in 
Belgrade was confined to yamaks (the janissary garrison) and to their officers, dahis.
26
 
It has to be noted that the Serbian Revolt should not be understood as a movement 
which was waiting for a spark to bloom for independence. Rather, as Stavrianos noted, 
“the uprising at the outset was not a revolutionary affair directed against the Ottoman 
rule” and “the Serbs wanted not a new order but a return to the old order with its 
autonomy and security”.27 It shows some clues related to the state-society relations of 
the period and the attitude of non-Muslim subject’s of the Empire to the central 
administration. The secessionist movements were not only based on nationalist urges. 
More importantly, this movement indicated crucial reflection of the Ottoman state-
society relations. Karal indicates that “the Serbian insurrection demonstrated the 
extreme weakness of the Ottoman government” since it took nine years to put down a 
local rebellion. In addition, it led to the realization of the necessity of an extensive 
administrative reform throughout the empire.
28
 Another result could be considered is 
that the problematic relations between state and society became evident.  
The Greek War of Independence was another event that has important effects on 
both Ottoman administration and the public opinion of the society. The importance of 
the independence of the Greeks for the Ottoman history comes from the point that it 
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denotes the beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration process.29 However, 
comparing to Serbian uprising it was different in other senses. Firstly, it brought Great 
Powers into the picture due to the strategic location of Greek lands compared to the 
local character of the Serbian uprising. Secondly, as argued by Stavrianos, “the Greek 
insurrection had widespread and lasting repercussions; the reason being that the Greeks 
had played a much more important role in imperial affairs than had the Serbs”.30 The 
Greek Phanariots were highly influential in the Ottoman state affairs starting from the 
translation affairs.   
The Ottoman reaction to the uprising did not consider it as national uprising 
initiated by Christians but they saw it as an example of rebellion against the state. 
According to them, Greeks were abrogating the protection agreement that regulate 
Muslim and non-Muslim relations. As Erdem argues, “nationalist or not, for the 
Ottomans the Greeks had abrogated the zimmet pact” and the repudiation of the pact 
necessitated a return to the state of affairs prior to the entry of the Greeks and made 
them once more harbis (warring non-Muslims).
31
 The Greek War of Independence, 
apart from its conjectural and global effects, was highly influential on the changing tone 
of the Muslim and non-Muslim relations in the empire at the non-elite level. Quataert 
argues that: 
“There had been revolts but, generally, these had worked within the system, 
claiming as their goal the rectification of problems within the Ottoman universe, 
such as the reduction of taxes or better justice. But in the nineteenth century – in 
the Balkan, Anatolian, and Arab provinces alike – movements emerged that 
actively sought to separate particular areas from Ottoman rule and establish 
independent, sovereign states subordinate to no higher political authority”.32  
In addition, the internal weakness of the empire was another reason behind the 
rising movements in the Balkans. Mazower argues that “In the case of the rise of the 
Balkan nation-state, their grand explanatory schemes attribute the success of Christian 
nationalism to emergent merchant diasporas and the impact of Western ideology. None 
of this would have counted had it not been for Ottoman military and administrative 
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weakness – especially at the empire’s fringes – and the changing international balance 
of power. The Serbs were militarily defeated by 1810, the Greeks by 1827, but they 
won their statehood nonetheless”.33 When British, French and Russian navies destroyed 
the Egyptian forces at Navarino, 1830 Treaty of London which was signifying the 
independence of Greece was signed. The effects of the changing nature of the uprisings 
in the Balkans towards an independence movement showed itself on the Muslim side of 
public opinion as one of the bases for dissident and increasing interreligious tensions. It 
contributed to the creation of a basis for a long-lasting distrust towards non-Muslims 
among Muslim community and it became intensified with Gülhane and Reform Edicts.  
Another issue combined these movements and the problems within the state. The 
results of Mohammad Ali Pasha issue made indirect contributions to the formation of 
public opinion. Defeat of Ottoman armies in Konya by Mohammad Ali Pasha was 
traumatic crisis for the Ottoman side. However, foreign diplomatic intervention stopped 
the armies of İbrahim Pasha. Fahmy states that “eventually, however, Mehmed 
(Mohammad) Ali rose above the narrow confines of Ottoman politics and realized that 
his acts had truly global implications”.34 The resolution was the Kütahya Treaty 
proposing the territories of Crete and Hijaz to Mohammad Ali Pasha and governorship 
of Syria to İbrahim Pasha. However, this was a verbal commitment which was not 
found very dependable for Mohammad Ali Pasha. Mahmud II asked for aid from Russia 
and it was resulted in the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi which involved a secret article that 
prescribed closing the Straits to foreign ships in case of an attack to Russia. It was 
signed in order to block the expansion of Mohammad Ali and preserve Ottoman 
territorial integrity and it would be the new policy of Russia towards İstanbul.35 In 1838, 
Mohammed Ali Pasha declared his wish for independence to Great Powers but he was 
declined since the European powers were not leaning towards any act that might lead to 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. By London Treaty, Mohammad Ali Pasha was 
granted the hereditary rule of Egypt.  
Again, the combination of the Ottoman state’s weakness and his organizational 
military superiority became a source of trouble for the administration. Militarily 
speaking, the success of Mohammed Ali was great and it was possible through 
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inflexible Ottoman response to an unexpected attack.
36
 It also intensified the 
intervention of Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire. An interesting point related to the 
Egyptian Question is referred by Cevdet Pasha. He argues that Mustafa Reşid Pasha 
was trying to handle two issues (Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye and Egyptian Question) at once. 
Some conservative (efkar-ı atika) statesmen were not pleased with the reform idea but 
since it would not be possible to blocking the reforms while the problem in Egypt was 
continuing they allowed the Edict.
37
 
The political issues were influential on both the Gülhane Edict and formation of 
the public opinion; however economic transformations were also requires attention 
considering the effects that they produced in later periods. The Anglo-Ottoman Treaty 
of 1838 created a crucial turning point in Ottoman economics since it denoted the 
integration of Ottoman economy to the capitalist world economy.
38
 In pre-1838 period, 
customs tariff ratio over imports and exports was 3 percent. The ratio for the domestic 
trade within the Ottoman Empire was 8 percent for merchants. With the Treaty of 1838, 
the customs tariff ratio over export increased to 12 percent and import to 5 percent 
respectively. In addition, domestic tariff continued to be applying for local merchants 
whereas foreign merchants were exempted. Therefore, as argued by Pamuk, foreign 
merchants gained significant privileges contrary to the local merchants. More 
importantly, the Ottoman administration accepted the Treaty irreversibly. Regarding 
Ottoman raw materials, monopoly system (yed-i vahit) which enables the central state to 
practice special limitations and extra tariff customs was eliminated. It meant loss of a 
significant revenue source for the Ottoman administration in the case of emergency 
periods.
39
 However, it has a political and practical reason against the crucial enemy of 
Mahmud II: Mohammad Ali Pasha. A new commercial code without monopolies would 
ruin Mohammed Ali financially and reassert the power of the Sultan in Egypt
40
.  
Cevdet Pasha, as an inner elite voice, indicates that in the old system of 
monopoly the state profited around seventy thousand for annually. Although with trade 
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liberation (serbesti-i ticaret) the state treasury lacked this profit, Egypt was damaged 
much more since most of the revenue which Egypt collected was coming from the profit 
from state monopoly. The need for extensive armies against Ottoman forces was 
creating huge expenditures that put the Egyptian state finance into jeopardy. More 
importantly, as Cevdet Pasha argues, the declaration of the Edict of Tanzimat-ı 
Hayriyye turned the public opinion in Aleppo and Damascus on the side of the Ottoman 
sultanate.
41
 As for the economic actors of the empire, the change in the composition of 
the merchant class was not surprising. There was a decrease in the number of the 
Muslim merchants during the eighteenth century when foreigners and Ottoman non-
Muslims were becoming dominant in the foreign trade.
42
 With the Treaty of 1838, the 
difference considering the mutual ratio became widened. It constituted another crack 
between the relations of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. 
Considering the incidents that are indicated above, they laid the basis for change 
in the state mentality and contributed to the formation of public mind. Deringil argues 
that “it became necessary, and even imperative, for the remaining Christian subjects of 
the empire, the reaya, particularly those in Rumelia, to be integrated into a new scheme 
of governance”.43 Both international and domestic changes in the political environment 
of the Ottoman Empire are combined and created the basis for the arising need of 
reform. Ortaylı states:  
“This principle of equality was adopted out of practical considerations seeking to 
find a solution for the crises created by structural changes in the Empire. These 
considerations were primarily the nationalist revolts and regional uprisings 
which had shaken the empire since the beginning of the century and it 
particularly related for those of the Balkan peoples provoked by the foreign 
powers”.44  
The principle of equality is open to discussion; however the incidents showed 
that the political and structural changes which the Ottoman Empire was facing required 
some radical reforms to cope with them. The independence of Greeks and abrogation of 
the zımmi pact, other revolts all over the territory of the empire including the uprising of 
Mohammad Ali Pasha from Kavala created the basis for new considerations regarding 
the zımmi population. The most concrete result was much-discussed document declared 
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in 1839, the Gülhane Edict. The next sub-chapter is reserved to the content of the 
document for a clear understanding for its implications.  
1.1.2 The Content of the Gülhane Edict 
 
The Edict starts with the justification provided by the reformers regarding the 
declining socio-economic position of the Ottoman Empire
45
. It is pointed out that as a 
state that was administrated under the rule of the Shari’a the Ottoman rule was powerful 
and the population was in welfare. Yet the prosperous conditions started to be upside-
down approximately 150 years ago since Shari’a rules and legal code (kanun) were 
violated due to several reasons. It is stated in the Edict that it is not possible for a state 
to survive with disobeying the rules of Shari’a. In addition, on the condition that 
necessary regulations were met the Ottoman state and society would ride out the storm 
within few years and reach a prosperous level. In this first introduction part, the 
rationale behind the edict was connected primarily to the worsening socio-economic 
condition of the empire. The reason of the worsening seems to disobeying the religious 
legal code of Shari’a and kanun at the first glance but it also refers to the several 
conditions that have no account in the original text but it implies territorial losses with 
and decreasing political power and economic effectiveness in both domestic and 
international terms. After the current problematic condition and the requirement of a 
change were stated, the reforms that are going to be held and their content were listed.  
Firstly, the essence of the new laws were based on the protection of life, honor, 
dignity and property together with the issues of taxation and military recruitment and 
time in service (emniyyet-i can ve mahfuziyyet-i ırz ve namus ve mal t’ayin-i vergi ve 
asakir-i mukteziyyenin suret-i celb ve müddet-i istihdamı)46. These were evaluated as 
the crucial concepts that will strengthen the bond between the state and society. If these 
are protected by the state, according to the Edict, individuals will not attempt to betray 
his/her state and work for its well-being and prosperity.  
Taxation is important for the state revenue but it has to be collected in a way that 
suits better for tax payers. The significant point is that it refers to “monopoly trouble” 
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(yed-i vahit beliyyesi)
47
 which was eliminated and “destructive iltizam application” 
(iltizamat usul-ı muzırrası)48 which was still in effect. Elimination of monopolies refers 
to the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Treaty or Treaty of Balta Liman in other words
49
. The Edict 
defines iltizam as an application in which crucial political and financial issues of the 
empire was left in the hands of a man who cannot be always reliable and honest. 
Therefore, the new regulation would be based on an equity principle in terms of 
taxation.  
For the military recruitment and time in service, more regular procedure and 
shorter military service were prescribed in the Edict. This part of the Edict is the most 
remarkable one in the sense that it brought new concepts to the Ottoman political 
understanding. Although, the protection of the tebaa by the Sultan not a new perception 
which was seen in the form of “circle of justice” (daire-i adalet) and in line with this 
understanding there is a similar form of state-society relations which was put into words 
in the Edict. As Somel states, according to the understanding of circle of justice, unjust 
oppression of the political ruling class on the population would cause decrease in the 
amount of tax income collected from the latter and it would led to the deterioration of 
the primary power source of the state meaning the army.
50
 The well-being and 
protection of the people were taken as the primary duty of the state. The essence of 
these principles that were bind with the oath of the ruler was under the influence of the 
constitutional monarchy ideas of the 1830-1840 Europe.
51
  
Secondly, the necessity of the “regulated laws” (kavanin-i nizamiyye)52 is 
underlined for strengthening the state and it is in line with the main idea of regulation 
(nizam) which constituted the core of the word used to define the reform era, Tanzimat. 
A significant part of the Edict is related to the crime and punishment issues. With the 
new regulations, the Edict supposes, there shall be no punishment without public trial 
according to Shari’a laws. Nobody shall give harm to anyone’s honor and everyone 
shall have a complete freedom concerning their property. The legator’s crime shall have 
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no effect on the inheritor and the state shall not practice confiscation regarding these 
kinds of cases.  
Thirdly and most importantly for the topic that will be discussed in this study, 
the new regulations mentioned in the Edict regarding the protection of life, honor, 
dignity and property will be effective and assured for both Muslims and other millets 
(referring to the non-Muslims communities). The text refers to the both sides as “ehl-i 
İslam” and “milel-i saire”53. It is also stated that the changes were done in line with the 
necessity of Shari’a verdict (hükm-i şer’i iktizası)54. The remarkable point is that this 
part does not pose equality of Muslims and non-Muslims per se. Only an implicit 
reference could be made with the phrase of milel-i saire. However, this does not mean 
that equality of Muslims and non-Muslims were taken as a principle since the principles 
mentioned in the Edict was limited to life, property and honor which was also a 
protection given to the non-Muslims through zimmet pact. However, although the Edict 
does not make a commitment regarding the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in 
essence, it was tried to be instilled by the Sultan and grand vizier in public speeches at 
the discursive level. As an illustration, grand vizier Rıza Paşa explained the mentality of 
the Edict to Greek, Armenian and Jewish community leaders came from İzmir, Sakız 
and Kavala:  
“You can be Muslim, Christian or Jewish it does not matter; you are the subject 
of a single ruler and children of a single father. Our Sultan ordered that rules of 
life, honor, dignity and protection shall be executed in each part of the empire. 
Therefore, if there is anybody among you who is oppressed he should apply for 
the administration of justice. Whole Ottoman tebaa, Muslim or Christian, rich or 
poor, military officials, state officials or religious officials, should be assured 
from the Sultan’s auspicious deeds who reflects mirror of the justice for 
everyone”55.  
In here, also, only equality that was promised was the one applied way before 
the Edict. There was nothing new related to the equality between Muslims and non-
Muslims. However, taking tebaa as a whole entity was underlined; equality between the 
state elite and tebaa is not the case
56
. Davison points out to the nuance between text of 
the Edict in Turkish and French. While in Turkish text, there is a distinction between 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects; in the French text it states as "These imperial 
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concessions are extended to all our subjects, of ·whatever religion or sect they may be”. 
Davison argues that it could arouse curiosity in the context that texts were prepared with 
their respective domestic and international audiences.
57
 This point also leads to the 
discussions over the degree of Western influence over the declaration of the Edict. 
Nevertheless, all in all, these concessions were not brand new in essence. The equality 
principle came with the Reform Edict of 1856 with its all new regulations in many 
spheres. 
The principle of life, honor and property protection could be related to the 
reformist cadre itself. Zürcher argues that this principle was connected to the desire for 
protecting their status which was open to danger as the servants (kul) of the Sultan in 
addition to repeating classical liberal thought learned from Europe.
58
 In addition, 
transfer of the properties as inheritance (tereke) of the state officials to the Sultan upon 
their death was also a problem that has reflections on the women in the families’ of the 
officials.
59
 
Another part is related to the functioning of the advisory council that was 
established during the reign of Mahmud II named as Supreme Council of Judicial 
Ordinances (Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliyye).60 It is stated in the Edict that since other laws 
which will elaborate the specifications also requires unanimity voting, the number of the 
members shall be increased and it shall be guaranteed that all members could express 
their opinions without any fear. The new regulations related to military issues shall be 
discussed and concluded in Bab-i Seraskeri Dar-i Şura. Each law shall be submitted to 
the Palace.  
Lastly, it is underlined that these laws shall be within the legitimacy of Shari’a 
and they will be only for the sake of well-being of the state and people. Therefore, all 
the high state officials will take the pledge not to violate these laws. Accordingly, a new 
criminal code of laws shall be arranged in a way that equal punishment will be hold for 
the specified crimes without nepotism. Bribery, which is both invalidated by Shari’a 
and one of the main causes of the decline of the state, shall be hindered by a law.  
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1.1.3 The Genre of the Edict 
 
 One of the debates that are related to the Edict is its genre. What is meant by 
genre is here refers to the form and meaning which possessed. Is it one of the regular 
legal documents that were declared before as an expression of the Sultans’ irade? Or 
does it contain a constitutional core? The answer of these questions is important in the 
sense that its potential novelty could have an effect on the reactions of the non-elites 
towards the Edict and changes brought by it.  
İnalcık defines the Edict as an example of a document of order (nizamname) 
which was common in earlier periods of the Ottoman history. The Sultan was capable of 
declaring customary law (örfi hukuk) apart from Shari’a by depending on his authority 
of absolute execution in order to make required regulations required by state needs. Of 
course, they cannot be against Shari’a and it should be for the benefit of Islamic 
community. He argues that Gülhane Edict is an illustration of this genre.
61
 Considering 
from this angle, it is quite clear that its main motive is regulation. However, as accepted 
by İnalcık, the modern elements and the ideas contained by the Edict may imply some 
differences comparing to the earlier nizamnames. Davison does not consider Gülhane 
Edict as a constitutional charter based on the idea that it does not reflect effective 
constraints on the power of Sultan rather than calling down the curse of God if anybody 
violates the new principles including the Sultan. Although the Edict mentions to basic 
principles of life, liberty and property of the European reforms of 1776 and 1789 and 
constitutes a fruitful basis to further reforms and constitution of 1876, he argues that 
“the edict of 1839 did not reflect the further progress of the ·French and American 
revolutions toward constitutional government, except in one particular”.62 The problem 
in here comes from the idea that the author takes the European documents and historical 
path taken by them as the single sign and argues that the low degree of resemblance 
shows falling behind. However, “small” steps should also be taken into account and 
considered within the boundaries of the certain time, space and condition in order to 
give meaning to the happenings.  
Regarding the genre of the Edict, Abadan argues that since it includes the 
relations between individuals and the state and the dynamics of the state administration 
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it is a real “Charte Constitutionelle” similar to the European experiences.63 Again here, 
there is a certain comparison with the European experiences but his analysis stays 
within the frame of time and place specificity. He states that in order to be a legal 
document to be a charter it does not have to be production of a revolution. This comes 
from the situation that a charter is declared by an actor who has the capacity of 
unilateral dominance competence to form the principles of organization. Since it was 
not a product of an organ which was granted competence by the population such as an 
assembly, the change or termination of the principles in the charter is not dependent on 
special procedures. However, their principles are bound by law unless they are changed 
or terminated. It does not have the modern understanding of principles of organization 
but it does not devaluate the significance of the document
64
 and it should be considered 
within the boundaries of its time and place. Rather than making a simple comparison, it 
is important to analyze deeper and looking to the essence of the document is more 
important and required. Findley agrees to the constitutional character of the Gülhane 
Edict by stating that it accepted the requirement for new laws in order to keep its 
promises and eliminate certain abuses. In addition, suggested reforms and criticized 
abuses resemble the European and American charters.
65
 The promises based on new 
laws mentioned by Findley and implementation of rule of law together with the 
protection of basic rights in a written form has a crucial role when discussing the genre 
of the Edict is considered. Leaving aside the resemblance with the European and 
America practices, the constitutionality of the document comes from these points. The 
motive for them could be for the sake of radical changes or a kind of restoration but the 
result contains a constitutional framework; although it is small scaled and in a 
preliminary form.   
1.1.4 Debates of the Motives behind the Gülhane Edict and Reforms 
 
 The process called Tanzimat era in general starting from the 1839 Gülhane Edict 
specifically brought many discussions in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire. The 
main arguments are focused upon the motives behind the Edict and reforms afterwards 
including the Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı) which was declared in 1856. The 
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problematique is mainly focused around few questions. The primary one is related to 
the position of the Ottoman Empire in the modernization process in global terms. Many 
of the classical studies related to the history of Turkey named after this crucial point and 
they mainly took the changes in the long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire as 
the inception of the modern Turkey’s birth66. The existence of the changes is obvious; 
however the nature and motives of the changes poses a good research question primarily 
in terms of modernization understanding. Although it requires an extensive work, this 
question will be addressed in this study briefly. What was the main dynamics that lead 
to “modernization” of the Ottoman Empire? To what extent, international or domestic 
factors were effective initiating the political changes in the form of extensive reforms? 
Or was there another impulsion other than the internal or external factors? Trying to 
understand the dynamics that created the basis for the political changes could help to 
have a more clear perception for making sense of the reactions of the non-elite segments 
of the society in the later parts of this study.  
 To begin with, Anscombe states that the dominant perception of the era is 
framed within the boundaries of the modernization theory and primarily proposed in the 
works of Bernard Lewis and Roderic Davison
67
. What is meant by modernization stems 
from the idea that accepting the pioneering role of Europe as an a priori phenomena and 
explaining the modernization process of the non-European countries as the “followers” 
of European civilization. Inevitably, this brings the fallacy of equating Westernization 
with modernization understanding which was frequently encountered in the 
historiography of the Ottoman Empire along with the other non-European states’ 
histories.  
This model neither explains the modernization of Europe nor the development of 
the non-European states and societies. Accordingly, this tendency does not take 
modernity and its development in Turkey not as it is but within the confines of belated 
modernity. Belated modernity refers to a general understanding which is not unique to 
Turkey but also used to explain the political, economic and social development of most 
of the “non-Western countries”. As it is put by Mitchell, what comes to mind when the 
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definition of modernization considered is the West and Europe in particular and its 
export to the non-Western societies. More importantly, he states that “the destiny of 
these regions has been to mimic, never quite successfully, the history already performed 
by the West”68 as a direct linkage to the notion of belated modernity. For Turkey, 
Ahıska uses the metaphor of “catching the train of modern civilization”69 and the reform 
efforts that start from the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II could be considered the 
first steps to trying to catch the train of Europe which departed years earlier. Belated 
modernity as a notion stems from the understanding that takes “the West” as a 
benchmark in world civilization and accordingly positions “the others” that were not 
able to reach the level of civilization realized by the West and particularly by Europe. 
They are the late-comers of world civilization in this sense and usually confined to be a 
copy of the Western model.  
Whether analyzing the process of Turkey as a success or failure story, most of 
the scholarship is focused on the Turkish imitation of Western perceptions
70
. Some of 
the analyses challenged the celebratory understanding of Ottoman and Turkish 
modernization
71
 but Lewis saw it as a success story criticizing European commentators’ 
interpretation of the reforms as “born death” and he argues that despite challenges they 
encountered they succeeded on many things. He argues that when it comes to 1871, “the 
destruction of the old order had been too thorough for any restoration to be possible; for 
better or for worse, only one path lay before Turkey, that of modernization and 
Westernization” and “she could move fast or slowly, straight or deviously; she could 
not go back”.72 In here modernization period is depicted as a linear process with a single 
origin of the West.  
Davison is another historian who analyses the modernization period and the 
reforms respectively from the lens of Westernization and set the dominant narrative of 
the concerning era. To illustrate, he defines the reign of Abdülmecid as a one 
“characterized by increased efforts at reform and Westernization along many lines” with 
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an emphasis on initiative of the minister of foreign affairs Mustafa Reşit Paşa.73 He 
argues that the dualism of the reforms in the sense that both new westernized 
institutions and traditional institutions of faith and state existed together just like the 
personality of the whole Tanzimat era. He argues that it was the result of Mustafa Reşid 
Paşa’s concern that made reforms palatable to Muslim conservatives since it was not 
possible to dismiss the references of religion, law and the glorious past.
74
 The same 
problem also rose here in the sense that it equates modernization with Westernization. 
This approach brings an Orientalist perception in itself and poses a problematic 
situation. Overall, it is a way of understanding the world but as Said argues it is a 
hegemonic pattern of representation of Eastern societies with characterizations such as 
backwardness and traditional in order to portray Europe as progressive and modern. 
Orientalist perception refers to all kind of features of the East in such a pejorative sense 
so that the West can be constructed with affirmative qualifications which brought 
progress and civilization to the world.
75
 When the Ottoman point of view is taken, it 
becomes a state’s struggle to imitate Western practices to get rid of the obsolete 
institutions and replace with the new ones that are in line with the ones in Europe 
specifically. The modernization process of the Ottoman Empire should be considered 
within the framework of its own particular progress and change. At some parts of its 
history, the state mentality strongly inclined to political and social change that could be 
called as “Westernization” line as it was the case in the Reform Edict but diffusing these 
particular perspectives to explain the reform period of the nineteenth century poses a 
problematic outlook and bring the analyses into disrepute.  
Another point of discussion that was also related to the discussions above is 
based on the degree of Great Powers’ intervention or influence regarding the declaration 
of the reforms. Berkes stated that the reforms were formulated and put into practice 
under the diplomatic intervention by the European powers.
76
 Karal interpreted the Edict 
and the reforms following it with the strong influence of the West although he did not 
specifically state the degree of it.
77
 The high degree of intervention or influence of the 
European powers over the reform process and on the rationale behind the Gülhane and 
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Reform Edicts specifically was a powerful narrative regarding the interpretations of the 
nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire. However, critical reviews challenged these 
interpretations later and produced different outlooks.  
Davison underlined the high degree of the international effect as “In the face of 
Mohammad Ali's serious threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it was 
imperative· that Reşid secured some outside help. Given the diplomatic situation of the 
time, this was most likely to be forthcoming from England. But the Ottoman Empire 
had to appear to be worth saving, to be reforming itself, and to be as liberal as the Egypt 
of Mohammad Ali”.78 Although the need for international support for an issue that 
could have serious problems in many dimensions including domestic unrest and 
decrease in the authority of the state in the eyes of people, reducing an extensive reform 
movement to certain pragmatist expectation in the international realm is a problematic 
approach especially when the idea for reform dates back earlier than the Gülhane Edict. 
Zürcher also interprets the timing of the Gülhane Edict as a diplomatic move that was 
made for the sake of support hoped from the Great Powers (especially Great Britain) 
concerning empire’s struggle with the Mohammad Ali Incident. However, he does not 
rule out the reformist cadre’s sincere concerns headed by Mustafa Reşid Paşa regarding 
the necessity of reforms which were continuation of Mahmud II’ policies.79 When it 
comes to the promises for Ottoman Christians, Zürcher argues that it was made for 
impressing European powers. At the same time, it was also a result of the sincere belief 
of Mustafa Reşid Paşa and his colleagues’ on the expectation that these promises would 
stop the separatist movements of Christian communities and intervention of Europeans 
especially of Russia. He states that the Gülhane Edict helped the expectations at least 
for short term.
80
 The urgent need for extensive reform has to have some material 
reasoning behind it and it shows the existence of practical problems that need concrete 
solutions. İnalcık argues that the core of the movement comes from the practical need of 
strengthening the state, developing the country and restoring the peace in the society. 
The issues such as Serbian autonomy, Greek Independence War and Russian influence 
over the Balkan communities were the most important part of the Tanzimat era. 
Tanzimat men, he states, applied the principles of equality before law and secularization 
of the state institutions as a political necessity born out of internal and external 
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pressures. He defines the Edict as crucial document that was prepared within a 
traditional framework but it brought modern concepts to state and law with the practical 
aims of restoring the administration.
81
 The political and international landscape created 
the main basis for an extensive change; however it should be noted that for the Ottoman 
Empire crisis is not something that is unfamiliar. A deeper perception that takes each 
possible dynamic should be considered as well.  
Structural changes in the economic sphere were also considered as one of the 
reasons behind the declaration of the Edict. Ahmad indicates that the reformist cadre 
was thinking that integrating with industrialized Europe and being a part of the 
expanding world market was the only way for the continuation and well-being of the 
empire.
82
 Although this may be an exaggerated point, it is clear that the economic 
position of the empire was also one of the major considerations of the Ottoman 
administration. Finkel argues that “If the Baltalimanı commercial convention of 1838 
was the price the Ottomans had to pay for British support in the settlement with 
Mohammad Ali, the proclamation of the Gülhane Edict was the cost of securing this 
self-interested support in the longer term.”83 Findley also points out the Edict as 
complementary to the liberal economic reforms in addition to the other dimension on 
the declaration of the Edict.
84
 The economic side should also be added to the picture for 
the full story. However, another dimension that was discussed in the literature is related 
to the nature of the motives and the main actors behind the Edict. İnalcık interpreted the 
need for legal compliance to Shari’a underlined in the Edict was just a choice of format 
which was done in order to calm down the conservative population led by ulama and 
preserve the status of the Sultan as the Caliph.
85
 Finkel points out to the “homegrown 
aspects of the Edict” as the influence of the members of the religious hierarchy and the 
pious character of the Sultan Abdülmecid
86
. The essence of this argument was firstly 
presented by Butrus Abu-Manneh. He discussed about the Islamic roots of the Gülhane 
Edict and underlined the significant role of some actors other than Mustafa Reşid Paşa. 
In Abu-Manneh’s words, “when Sultan Abdülmecid rose to the Sultanate, both the 
Palace and the Porte appear to have been motivated by the ideals of Orthodox Islam, 
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perhaps more than at any time before” and as a result “this might have helped to 
determine their view as to the measures needed to put an end to the prevailing 
malpractices and abuses of power, and to restore security and justice into the acts of the 
government and throughout the Ottoman lands”.87 In addition, he points out to the 
Sultan’s own initiative over the reforms rather than focusing on only Mustafa Reşid. 
Abdulmecid issued an irade two weeks after Gülhane Edict to the government officials 
to assure “following the law of justice and equity in all matters and to observe 
constantly "the application of the honored şeri’at in all the affairs of the ex-alted 
sultanate ...”.88 He argues that: 
“Adaletnames are usual but these decrees differ from Abdulmecid's irade in that 
they were normally addressed to governors, judges, or military commanders in 
the provinces and concerned with abuses of authority committed by them or by 
their subordinates there. This irade of Sultan Abdulmecid was issued to his own 
ministers meeting in council and was concerned not with specific abuses but 
with general principles. This is what makes it of special interest to us here 
because it contains basic principles that were to appear afterwards in the 
Gülhane, for example, that the shari’a should be applied, that justice and 
righteousness should prevail, and that care should be given to "all" the subjects 
of His Majesty, as well as the required guarantees for their well-being. 
Furthermore, this irade was drafted at the Palace while Reşid was still in London 
and about two months before his return which means that such ideas were not 
exclusively Reşid's and his young associates but shared by others”89 
As argued before, a deeper perception that considers each dynamic should be 
adopted and while doing so superficial or deterministic argumentations should be 
avoided. As long as such an outlook is internalized, it is possible to explain the reactions 
of the people accurately. Findley argues that in order to make comprehensive 
interpretation one needs take both Western and Islamic factors into account. To 
illustrate, rights may imply liberal themes at the first glance they do not represent 
individualistic values. They are looking from the lens of benefits to community and to 
state since the period could be considered as a middle form between the Islamic 
philosophy and nationalist ideas. Therefore, the Edict does not represent a single 
ideology but it evokes the themes of commonly shared politics and political 
philosophy.
90
 This is a highly significant point in the sense that expecting a clear 
disconnection from years of administrative practice and a powerful political culture is 
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neither logical nor realistic. For a reform to be great, changes in both theoretical and 
practical life could be the reformulation of earlier ideas in a new form. In fact, sources 
of the ideas in the Edict could be traced to the medieval Islamic political thinking as 
Abu-Manneh indicates. The linear connection between justice, security, prosperity and 
loyalty to the ruler and the community can be found in the Ghazali’s “Council of 
Princes” (Nizam’ül Mülük) and it is not new for the Ottoman political thinking.91 As for 
the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, he argues that there is nothing against 
Shari’a in the Edict since non-Muslims were entitled to be protected by the Muslim 
ruler as zımmis. In addition, equality before law in here did not lead to civil or political 
equality and the legal status of the non-Muslims.
92
 Another point is the frequent use of 
the description “laws in accordance with Sharia” (kavanin-i şeriye) for the new laws 
that will be going into effect. Findley argues that the state laws are named as kavanin in 
Ottoman political system apart from Sharia law. The frequent use of this expression 
shows the will for matching state laws and Sharia. He indicates that this point is 
unnoticed by scholars who have the tendency to consider the Edict as a step of 
Westernization.
93
  
Another argument is related to the target group of the reforms. In line with the 
argumentation of Abu-Manneh, contrary to the common view that the reforms were 
primarily targeted non-Muslim population. Anscombe states that reform was 
fundamentally shaped by, and for, Muslim interests: healing divisions within the 
community of believers, reconciling their enduring goals, and concentrating their 
energies upon defense against external threats”.94 The point is that it does not have to 
have a specific target group; the structure and main content of the Edict clarifies this. 
The continuation of the empire is based on the both groups, the majority and minorities. 
It was designed to ease the dissatisfaction of both groups as a reflection of general 
discontent and problems. With such an umbrella framework, it is highly likely that the 
central administration hoped to cure the social cracks within a unifying perception. 
Focusing on a certain group will likely lead more problems, especially when the 
movements in the Balkans are considered. The cadre chose the most suitable solution of 
the time and space and it was not out of pure practical reasons. Abu-Manneh indicates 
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that “it is suggested to see the motives behind the Gülhane Rescript as a mixture of 
idealism and political expediency”.95 However, when the political climate was changed, 
the solution changed with it. Considering the Gülhane Edict as an a priori “great 
change” without analyzing its content independent from its historical context is 
misleading since it would be tempting to be considering it within the framework of 
metanarrative. As Rubin argues: 
“As it is often the case with metanarratives, the secularization narrative tends to 
emphasize those events or processes that are supposed to demonstrate the mega- 
change that can always be presented in a single word, while it simultaneously 
marginalizes or simply pays no heed to phenomena that suggest otherwise. By 
the same token, metanarratives tend to debar individual social experiences of 
ordinary people and present ideas of intellectual and bureaucratic elites as the 
sole impetus for social change.”96 
 
This perspective is not only the case for secularization narrative but also it is 
effective for the whole early Tanzimat period that lasted until 1856 Reform Edict. 
Considering the Gülhane Edict and comparing to the Reform Edict, a deeper glance to 
the context shows only promises. As for the non-Muslim rights, it does not divert from 
the zimmet pact of Islam adopted by the Ottoman administration and this pact will be 
elaborated in the next chapter. The essence of the document does not divert from the 
basic Islamic legal principles but the significance comes from the fact that they had 
been declared by the ruler in a written form and refers to the human rights. Therefore, it 
could be considered as having an inceptional constitutional character.  However, it 
should also be noted that this constitutional character is highly preliminary and does not 
mean that it is a constitution. Rather, it is one of the steps on the way to the Ottoman 
Constitution of 1876. Refraining from metanarratives would give the chance to have a 
clear perspective when the reactions of the non-elite members of the Ottoman society is 
considered and investigated.  
 
1.2 The Reform Edict 
 The Reform Edict (which is known in Turkish as Islahat Fermanı) was prepared 
in the final years of the Crimean War. Cevdet Pasha narrates that the preparation of the 
Edict was done by a commission consisted of some ministers and foreign ambassadors 
                                                          
95
 Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots”, p. 198 
96
 Avi Rubin,  Ottoman Nizamiye Courts Law and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 59. 
29 
 
together with Şeyhülislam Arif Efendi. He argues that the privileges of the non-Muslim 
communities (teba’a-ı gayr-i müslimenin imtiyazatı) was one the most significant issues 
of the year of 1856. 
97
 It was read and declared in front of the ministers, state officials, 
Şeyhülislam (chief jurisconsult), patriarchs, chief rabbi and prominent members of the 
religious communities in February 28, 1856 in Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali) by Kaymakam 
Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha and then it was sent to the states that were working on the 
Treaty of Paris.
98
 The historical conjuncture and the preparation of the Reform Edict 
represents striking differences compared to the Gülhane Edict. The reference to it in the 
Paris Treaty is one of the examples. However, the differences were not limited to its 
formal character but also its content and the influence that it created for both Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities in the Empire.   
1.2.1 The Background of the Reform Edict: Crimean War 
 
 Although many other events could be counted as important in the period 
between 1839 Gülhane Edict and 1856 Reform Edict, the most significant and long-
term influential issue was the Crimean War started in 1853 following the disputes over 
Holy Sites in Jerusalem. In 1850, the president of the French Republic Prince Louis-
Napoleon reinstated a claim of custody over the Holy Sites aiming to have support from 
Catholic clerics at home. In 1852, their demand was accepted and keys of Church of the 
Nativity were given to the Catholics in Jerusalem with restrictions to satisfy Russia due 
to the Orthodox dissident.
99
  However, there was a significant meeting between British 
ambassador and the Tsar of Russia that gave ground for extensive problems for the 
Ottoman Empire in 1853. In the meeting between London and St. Petersburg, the 
Ottoman Empire was referred as “the Sick Man of the Europe” for the first time with 
the Tsar Nicholai’s hope to gain the Danubian Principalities, Bulgaria and Serbia while 
leaving Egypt and Crete to the British.
100
 It was not something out of thin air. The 
general condition and weakness despite its efforts to show otherwise gradually led to 
“gaining” this title. Concerning the Europe-oriented international climate of the time, 
the Ottoman Empire was the object of the “Eastern Question” since it did not play an 
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influential role in the European politics.
101
 Relying on this tacit agreement however 
London was hesitant, Russia declared its claims over the recognition of Russia’s rights 
over the Orthodox subjects and the Holy Sites in 1853. Their claim was rejected by the 
Ottoman administration. As Sander argues, the dispute over Holy Sites was the sudden 
and close reason behind the Crimean War rather than being the crucial one.
102
 From 
Russian point of view, “the Sick Men of the Europe” was an easier target to break it 
down. However, the British were not eager to help collapse of the Ottoman Empire and 
gave her support against Russia. In line with the dispute over the Holy Sites, France also 
supported the Ottomans. The result was the conflict between the Ottoman Empire 
together with Anglo-French support against Russia and Crimean War broke out in 
1853.
103
 Nonetheless, portraying the Ottoman Empire as a pure victim of the European 
power politics might be misleading. Badem argues that: 
“At present most historians (except for the new Russian Orthodox nationalists) 
accept that the question of the holy places was no more than a pretext for the 
Crimean War. That the issue of the holy places was a fabrication to conceal the 
imperialist aims of the tsarist Russia, or that the defense of the Ottoman Empire 
by Britain and France was simply because of imperialist rivalry, is a 
commonplace in contemporary Turkish historiography. While these factors 
appear true, one has to be consistent and apply the same skepticism to the 
actions of the Ottoman Empire as well. Many Turkish historians like to perceive 
the Ottoman state as a simply victim of the great powers, without itself having 
any imperialist or expansionist aims or practices (…)”104 
A perception that includes both Ottoman and European cases would produce 
more fruitful and accurate analysis. Notwithstanding, it is out of the scope of this study 
and requires further research.
105
  
The Crimean War was ended with the defeat of Russia in 1856. The peace 
settlement was made by Treaty of Paris which was signed between Russia and the 
alliance of Ottoman Empire, British Empire, French Empire and Kingdom of Sardinia 
in the Congress of Paris. The Danubian European Commission was established in order 
to put the river under international supervision for avoiding its blockage. The Black Sea 
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region was neutralized.
106
  The most significant part of the Congress and the Treaty for 
this study was related to the non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire. Article 7 
of the Treaty poses a significant position to the Ottoman state: 
“His Majesty the Emperor of France, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, Her 
Majesty the Queen of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty 
the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians and His 
Majesty the King of Sardinia declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate 
the advantages of the public law and concert of Europe. Their majesties engage 
each on his part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire and guarantee in common the strict observance of this 
engagement and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as 
a question of general interest.”107 
As a victor of Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Concert of 
Europe with the Treaty of Paris with this article. The independence and the integrity of 
the empire were taken under the guarantee of the European states. Another article was 
more closely related with the topic of this study: 
“His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the 
welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman, which, while ameliorating their 
condition without distinction of Religion or of Race, records his generous 
intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a 
further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to 
the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his 
Sovereign will. The Contracting Powers recognize the high value of this 
communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the 
said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the 
relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the Internal 
Administration of his Empire.”108 
More importantly, the Treaty was referring to the Reform Edict in Article 9 as 
“the powers ‘recognized the high value’ of the Edict which the Sultan had 
communicated to them and declared that this communication gave them no right to 
intervention in the internal affairs of the empire”.109 As Badem indicates, the position of 
the Ottoman statesmen was vulnerable vis a vis the reform demands and pressures from 
the European powers due to the war and their support to Ottoman side against Russia; in 
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return they demanded improvements for the non-Muslim subjects of the empire.
110
 The 
resulting document was the Reform Edict whose content will be analyzed in detail 
below.  
1.2.2 The Content of the Reform Edict 
 
 During the meetings in Paris related to the peace conditions, a commission in 
İstanbul was gathering in order to discuss and prepare the content of the Reform Edict. 
The British ambassador Stratford Canning de Redcliff was making efforts for these 
discussions. The commission was including Grand Vizier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and some other high state officials together with the ambassadors from Britain, France 
and Austria. As Yeniçeri states, the commission was dominated with different theses 
over the non-Muslim population living under Ottoman Empire. The British thesis was 
defending full freedom of religion and rule of law; while French arguments were based 
on the abolitions of the differences between Islamic and non-Muslim tebaa in terms of 
community, rights, taxation, military service, education and state officialdom. The 
Ottoman perception was arguing that the concessions given to the non-Muslim tebaa 
started from the reign of Mehmed II (the Conqueror) and they were consisted of two 
parts. One is related to freedom of conscious and the Sublime Porte was ready to 
renovate them. However, the second part was including the concessions related to civil 
rights, justice and autonomy. Since the Gülhane Edict accepted the equality between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, the Sublime Porte cannot give these concessions.
111
 
Although the equality issue in Gülhane Edict is open to discussion as indicated in the 
earlier sections of this work, the arguments were shaped in this framework. This also 
shows the mentality of the state at the time and explains the fears experienced by 
Mustafa Reşid Paşa.  
 The introduction of the Edict refers to beginning of a new era (zaman-ı hayriyyet 
iktiranın mebdei) which starts with stabilization of the foreign policy thanks to the 
support of the allies.
112
 The principle of the protection of life, honor and property which 
was mentioned in the Gülhane Edict was again assured (te’kıd ve te’yid) in the Reform 
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Edict with an emphasize. With this reference, Gülhane Edict was officially approved 
again. The first glance shows continuation and tenacious connection with the Gülhane 
Edict. Nonetheless, the Reform Edict has a perspective beyond to be complementary of 
the earlier Gülhane Edict.  
The concessions (imtiyazat) given to non-Muslim communities and religious 
exemptions shall continue and if there would be new needs arising from changing 
conditions; special assemblies shall be created in the patriarchates and they would be 
presented to the Sublime Porte.
113
 With this article, representation principle was 
regulated with a legal document. Their tenure would be life-long.
114
 Election procedure 
of the religious leaders shall be reviewed and they shall take an oath of loyalty to the 
Ottoman state. The fees that the communities were paying to their leaders, cevaiz and 
aidat shall be abolished and the leaders shall be put on the payroll.
115
 Just like the 
abuses in the iltizam system, collecting more money from the population was also a 
problematic case regarding the religious leaders under these fees. The solution was 
found in the enrollment to the regular monthly payments from the state. Thus, it created 
a dissident among some of the religious members. The instant reaction came from the 
metropol of İznik after the Edict was read and put in its silk pouch: “God shall allow 
that it will never come out again”.116 
The community issues shall be transferred to assemblies consisted of both 
religious and civil members. This brought a civilian voice in the communitarian issues. 
Repair of the public places belonged to non-Muslim communities such as schools or 
hospitals shall be allowed but reconstruction shall need permission from the 
government. In the places where the population was consisted of only one sect public 
religious ceremonies shall be allowed. Regardless of the magnitude, all sects shall have 
the religious freedom. Humiliating idioms regarding non-Muslim sects shall be 
prohibited. No one shall be forced to conversion.
117
 Before the Edict, communal public 
places were strictly under control in terms of repairing and reconstruction.  
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Regardless of the race and sect, each tebaa shall have the right to be a state 
official. Anyone who has the required qualities shall have the right to enroll in military 
and administration schools (mekatib-i askeriyye ve mülkiye).
118
 Minority schools shall 
be allowed on the condition that their programs and teachers were scrutinized and 
approved by an assembly of education (Meclis-i Maarif). This part is the most crucial 
point in the Reform Edict regarding the non-Muslim populations. Opening the state 
institutions to the excluded segments of the society is a grand change that has 
repercussions over both state and society. There were non-Muslim originated officials 
even in the highest ranks of the state mechanism; however it was the result of devşirme 
system which requires extensive assimilation to the Ottoman structure including 
conversion and more importantly it was done with the direct initiative of the state. 
Nonetheless, with this Edict it becomes possible for non-Muslim individual to be a part 
of state mechanism through their individual initiative. As Somel remarks, before the 
Edict, except for the community schools, the only way to build a school for non-
Muslims could only be possible with a ferman from Sultan. Establishment of Meclis-i 
Maarif is a part of the process that includes the integration of non-Muslim schools into 
state education system and as supervision institution it is also a central administrative 
unit.
119
 
Considering the murder and trade trials caused by hostilities between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, the hearing will be done by mixed courts in public (aleni). Prisons 
shall be reformed in accordance with justice and human rights (hukuk-ı insaniyyeyi 
hukuk-ı adalet ile). All kinds of torture and abuse shall be prohibited.120 Nizamnames 
shall be prepared in order to hinder corruptions and injustices in the mixed assemblies 
in provinces and districts. As stated by Davison, before this idea each individual would 
take an oath according to their formulae but with these statements in the Edict “implied 
the removal of millet barriers and the substitution of a common citizenship for all 
peoples of the empire”.121  
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Non-Muslims shall also be liable to fulfillment of mandatory military duties just 
like the Muslim population. Nevertheless, they shall have the option of fulfilling this 
duty through paying fee (bedel).
122
  
On the basis of the regulations with other states (suver-i tanzimiyye) foreigners 
could have possess real estate (tasarruf-u emlak) on the condition that they obey the 
rules established for local tebaa.
123
 This part was another important section that gives 
significant economic rights and means entitled to foreigners in Ottoman Empire. In this 
sense, 1858 Land Code would lead to a more secure system and in 1867 foreigners 
would gain the right to have real estate in cities and suburbs.
124
 
With the abolition of iltizam system, taxes shall be collected directly by state.
125
 
This was a repetition and emphasized in the Gülhane Edict. The religious leader of the 
each community shall participate in the meetings of Meclis-i Valay-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye in 
the issues related to all tebaa. The members of the Meclis-i Vala shall speak freely. 
Although freedom of speech in this sense seems to be highly unusual in Ottoman case, 
the sultans such as Selim III were also interested in the opinions of the other bureaucrats 
in consultancy assemblies (meşveret meclisleri). Importance shall be attached to 
European culture and shall be benefited from the issues of education, knowledge and 
capital of it (maarif ve ulum ve sermaye-i Avrupa’dan istifade).126 The Westernization 
understanding is very clear in this statement.  
In accordance with the background of the preparation conditions, the Reform 
Edict was mainly directed to the non-Muslim communities in Ottoman Empire and their 
rights. Acer argues that: 
“In the Reform Edict which aims to increase freedom of Christian minorities and 
in proclamation of which the effect of foreign States are clearly seen, the use of 
statements such as “kâffe-i sunuf-ı tebaa-ı sahanemin”, “cümlesi bilafark”, “ 
kâffe-i tebaa-i mülukaname”, “kâffe-i tebaa-i saltanat-ı seniyyem” shows that 
this edict is a discourse towards all people of the Ottoman State. In addition, the 
edict approaches every part of the society with an egalitarian understanding by 
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saying “kâffe”. However most of decrees were in support of Christian minority 
except Muslim and non-Muslim equality pledged with the Tanzimat Edict.”127 
 
 The Edict claims that it aimed to strengthen the “heartfelt bonds of patriotism” 
(revabıt-ı kalbiye-i vatandaşi) in order to unite all the subjects in the Ottoman 
Empire.
128
 Although just a slight equality reference was made in Gülhane Edict and it 
was highly disputable, the equality matter is elaborated in here over state institutions. 
Nonetheless, there are no additional rights or changes regarding Muslims, thus it clearly 
shows the limited target group of the Reform Edict contrary to the Gülhane Edict. It 
was mainly directed to enhance the patriotism feeling of the non-Muslim subjects which 
was a reflection of the Ottomanism doctrine of the state at the time. However, the 
reactions were different that the expected as interpreted by Cevdet Pasha. He argues that 
non-Muslims were happy with the new edict at first since they were become equal with 
Muslims. Yet, they were not pleased with the determination of the duties’ of patriarchs 
and religious authorities. In addition, he argues, there was an implicit hierarchy between 
the Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews respectively. With the principle of equality for 
all, the Greeks were complaining about the new situation: “The State equalized us with 
the Jews but we were consent with superiority of Islam”.129 
 The first and foremost difference of the Reform Edict in the literature is the 
strong European external effect over the declaration of this reform program. Looking at 
the procedure and the actors involved leaves no further room for discussion. The cadre 
led by Mehmed Emin Ali and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Pashas showed European 
oriented inclinations towards reformation understanding and they were more eager and 
precipitant for greater changes than their predecessor Mustafa Reşid Pasha. The Islamic 
character and internal strive was dominant in the Gülhane Edict. In contrast, there are 
no Islamic references or glorious past of the Empire. However, a deeper difference was 
in the context. The Gülhane Edict was consisted of vague promises without concrete 
essence regarding the non-Muslim population. On the contrary, the Reform Edict is 
quite concrete and brought significant changes. The Reform Edict was not instantly 
internalized and seen as a contradiction to the old traditions. An anecdote from Cevdet 
Pasha illustrates the situation. After the reading of the edict, Şeyhülislam Arif Efendi 
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asked from someone to pray as a custom. Although Fuad Pasha clarified that there 
would be no praying after the declaration since it was all about the equality between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, Şeyhülislam was not aware of this order. When the praying 
was done, the disturbance among the non-Muslim religious authorities was clear. 
Serasker Rüşdi Pasha made a metaphor to describe the situation: 
“Just like a man works hours and hours over a report but accidentally spill his 
inkwell all over it and he becomes so sad about his wasted efforts, this praying 
after the reading of this edict created the same feelings.”130 
 
 Before going into the analyses on the social level, the perceptions at the state 
elite level should also be considered.  Mustafa Reşid Pasha openly criticized the Reform 
Edict and blamed Ali and Fuat Pashas to prepare an Edict based on concessions to non-
Muslim communities. Cevdet Pasha quotes his long layiha (memorandum) in Tezakir. 
He refers to the underlying idea in the Edict as “full equality” (müsavat-ı kamile). He 
strictly criticizes the pace and scope of the Edict and points out to the possible reactions 
from Muslims. He also accused the cadre for following the European demands and 
reference of the Edict in the Paris Treaty.
131
 However, as Davison remarks, he was also 
arguing that the Reform Edict did not go far enough.
132
 Ali and Fuad Pashas were the 
high state officials who followed Mustafa Reşid Pasha and they were quite effective and 
powerful in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s attitude and the reason 
behind it is unclear however it should be noted that labeling the political actors of the 
period as “reformist” or “reactionist” is a problematic view. Concerning the conditions 
of the period, it is more likely that power politics was at work. Nonetheless, it stays as a 
mystery that requires specific study with more sources. 
 All in all, considering the Gülhane Edict and Reform Edict together, one could 
not refrain himself/herself from the debates and dichotomy of modernization and 
Westernization concepts. As it was argued in the beginning of this section, scholars 
should not base their arguments and researches over the simplistic view of 
Westernization when analyzing the Tanzimat period. However, it is also seen that 
Westernization phenomenon was also dominant path for the idea formation of the 
period approximately starts with the Reform Edict. The position and idea formation of 
the elites should also be taken into consideration in order to have an accurate perception 
and it is beyond the research question of this thesis. Nevertheless, one point should be 
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mentioned. Timur argues that “the Ottoman modernization model” is not the one that 
was formulated comparatively under free conditions and derived from the realities of 
the Ottoman society. Rather, it was the sum of the actions that were imposed by 
European powers in a highly different power balance compared to the earlier 
centuries.
133
 It is true that the influence of the European powers was remarkable. Yet it 
is not possible to condition the reforms within this mere “force” relation. The external 
pushes combined with the internal dynamics affected from the idea flows of primarily 
nationalism created such a basis for the Ottoman elite that they started to see themselves 
from the lens of Europe. If there were no immediate and fatal crises, it was more likely 
for the Ottoman Empire to follow its own alternative modernization path. The overall 
pragmatist state administration of the Ottoman Empire for centuries would require 
grand political changes at the end. It was the problem of a combined dynamics and 
timing problem. When the threats were not immediate, they draw a different route and 
created Gülhane Edict which could not be considered as a pure Western imitative 
document. However, when the threats were close enough and the political condition 
seemed not to be stable, as it was the case for the preparation of the Reform Edict, they 
looked for a short cut and found it in the Europe. Nevertheless, the problem was after a 
certain point, as Berktay argues, Ottoman state elite was also adopted a Euro-centric and 
an Orientalist perception in themselves when “the relegation” in the civilization arena 
started to felt itself heavily. This relationship with full admiration would turn into a 
love-hate relationship
134
 and would show itself in the “occidentalist fantasies of the 
West” in contemporary Turkey.135 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LEGAL STATUS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE NON-MUSLIM 
SUBJECTS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The legal position of the non-Muslim population and their administration in the 
Ottoman state practices constitutes an important basis for the understanding of the 
public opinion formation. The changes at the political and legal level have a direct or 
indirect influence on the formation of opinions and value judgments since they generate 
a more concrete ground that has clear reflections on the everyday lives of the people. 
Without understanding the changes in the state level both in general and in particular, it 
is not possible and preferable to trace the reactions in social strata.  
The purpose of the first chapter was to frame a bigger picture and define the 
stance of the Tanzimat reforms both in the literature and the Ottoman history. However, 
the main question of this study, that is the reactions of the non-elites to the reforms and 
the underlying causes behind them, requires a more detailed outlook to the legal and 
political position of the communities in the Empire. Therefore, the Ottoman system 
regarding the non-Muslim subjects of the society before and after the Tanzimat reforms 
should be analyzed to have a clear perception. In accordance with this aim, this chapter 
will be reserved to the condition of non-Muslim communities specifically. In an empire 
which had based its legal system on Shari’a, the “exceptional” position refers to the 
legal condition of the non-Muslim communities. Thus, an examination of the non-
Muslim position will implicitly reveal Muslim condition that does not necessitate 
separate study since the former was constituted according to the latter group.  
First, pre-Tanzimat system which is often referred as “millet system” will be 
examined. It will also include the critics related to the conceptualization of the millet 
system. Secondly, post-Tanzimat situation will be analyzed with respect to political and 
economic transformations. This part will also include the debates related to 
“Ottomanism” policy of the period. The debates of the Ottomanism policy is significant 
in the sense that it was basically targeted the non-Muslim communities in the society 
and the problem of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
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2.1 Legal Status and Administration of the Non-Muslims in pre-Tanzimat Era 
 
 To begin with, the most crucial point related to the Ottoman legal system, there 
was no uniform body of law. The legal system was based on Shari’a law which 
constituted the legal side of Islam as a religion. Rather than to be founded by Muslim 
conquerors, the Islamic and theocratic character of the Ottoman Empire comes from its 
legal organization primarily based on Islamic law together with the secular kavanin of 
the rulers. Kanunnames (secular law books) “were actually enactments of written 
versions of customary and sultanic law, legitimized by the Islamic principle of siyasa 
shar’iyya, namely, the Şer’i recognition in the necessity of state legislation on specific 
issues not covered by the Şeriat, mostly in matters of criminal law, land tenure, and 
taxation”.136 Avi rightly argues that “the legal duality” between kanun and Shari’a law 
that was underlined by the literature is not realistic in the sense that “kanun 
formulations often replicated Şer’i legal principles while integrating them with new 
legal concepts” and also kanun was the making of ulama.137 This perspective in the 
literature is also likely to consider Gülhane Edict of 1839 as a document which is 
completely out of Islamic framework. Dichotomous perception is not accurate when 
studying the Ottoman legal system. Swerving from the classical understanding of 
Shari’a coincides with the dissolution process of the Empire.  
When the classical period of the Empire was considered, Shari’a was the 
primary legal source. Nonetheless, due to its primarily religious character, the first and 
basic distinction was made between Muslims and non-Muslims. The origin of this 
distinction is not originated from Ottoman practice but it took its core from Islam itself. 
In Islamic public law, people are considered in two main groups. First group is 
constituted by Muslims who has citizenship rights and duties whereas the second group 
is composed by non-Muslims whose political rights and law that they are subjected to is 
different from the first group of Muslims. The position of the second group was 
determined by the special agreement named as “dhimma” (zimmet) between the 
concerning non-Muslim groups and the Islamic state.
138
  The direct meaning of the 
word zimmet is protection and it was referred to protection of the state.   
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The practice of zimmet agreement dates back to the very beginnings of the 
Islamic state founded under the rule of Prophet Muhammad. As Bosworth indicates 
“when the Prophet and his followers had achieved majority power in one town at least 
of Arabia and, and were therefore forced to consider the question of Muslim 
community’s relationship to minorities, in the case of Medina specifically, a Jewish 
minority” and he also points out that the question of dissenting minorities was also the 
case for Byzantine and Sassanid Empires which were the contemporaries of the Islamic 
state of Prophet Muhammad.
139
  
However, the agreement is not made with all of the non-Muslims that are in an 
interaction with the Islamic state. There are certain categorizations in Islamic 
understanding of state-society relations and interactions with the non-Muslims. The 
zimmet pact is made up with an only specific group of non-Muslims. As Küçük 
explains, regarding Islamic understanding, in religious terms, non-Muslims are 
distinguished as the ones who are a part of ahl-i kitab and those who are not a part of 
ahl-i kitab group. Being a member of ahl-i kitab means to believe in a religion that 
received a holy book from God, the People of the Book. This group includes Christians 
and Jews since they were recognized by Quran. In political context, non-Muslims are 
cleaved into two groups as ahl-i harb (those who are in a war condition with Muslims) 
and ahl-i ahd (those who made an agreement with Muslims). Ahl-i ahd is consisted of 
three sub-categories: zımmis (those who accept the protection of Islamic state), muaheds 
(those who is in peace with Muslims) and müstemins (those who has aman).
140
 
Therefore, the zimmet pact applies to the non-Muslims who are subjects of ahl-i kitab 
and as a result of these gained the title of zımmi. The term zımmi is seen in the 
Constitution of Medina and Bosworth argues that it means that “all within the umma are 
equally protected, and all are able to give protection to other members, so that complete 
solidarity, with everyone in the dual role of protector and protected, is assured for 
all”.141 The point is that zimmet agreement provides equal protection for non-Muslims 
with Muslims as a principle.  
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This is the application of Shari’a law to the non-Muslim communities under 
Islamic rule and the Ottoman non-Muslims were also considered within this framework. 
The scope of this protection is highly important. As Bayır points out “in line with the 
Islamic law, non-Muslim ‘People of the Book’ were organized under the ‘millet’ 
structure and subjected to dhimmi (zımmi) status where their lives, honor, property, 
cemeteries and corpses, and the free practice of their religion were protected on the 
condition of their loyalty to the state and acceptance of their inequality and subordinate 
status”.142 These rights are often considered to be the proof of “Ottoman tolerance” in 
common literature. As Eryılmaz points out “this tolerance” was frequently related to 
moral attitudes of the Ottoman sultans although it is only a part of the Ottoman legal 
system as a whole.
143
 Furthermore, as it can be seen in a closer look, the origins of the 
structure regarding the non-Muslim groups a certain legal status comes from the zimmet 
pact which is an early Islamic concept. “The acceptance of their inequality and 
subordinate status” is the most crucial part of this pact. The origin goes back to Quran 
again. It says “Fight against those who disbelieve in God and the Last Day, who do not 
account forbidden what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who do not follow 
the religion of truth, from amongst those who have been given the Book, until they pay 
the cizye in exchange in exchange for a benefaction granted to them, being in a 
humiliated position”.144  Regarding the zimmet pact that lays the basis for the Ottoman 
non-Muslim subjects, the equal protection of them comes with the condition of being in 
an inferior status.  
2.1.1 The Foundation of the Administrative Structure of Non-Muslim 
Communities 
 The expansion policy of the Ottoman Empire in a relatively short period of time 
brought varying ethnicities together especially considering the conquest of the Balkan 
territories under the central administration of the Empire. This multiethnic structure that 
the Ottoman administration faced showed the requirement of different policies than the 
ones considered by simple principalities or small kingdoms. The crucial point in 
considering the Ottoman system is that it does not have moralist (as it was in the 
common argument of “Ottoman toleration”) but rather rationalist perception in its own 
terms. “The rationalism” of the system should not be confused with modernist 
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rationalism which became dominant with the Enlightenment.  Rather, as Barkey argues, 
“its success was based on their intrinsic flexibility and ability to adopt”.145 Adopting a 
system which is both legitimized in Islamic sense since it was the practice of the 
Prophet Muhammad and successful considering the historical conjuncture of the time. 
Furthermore, it was not only the case in sociopolitical but also affected the economic 
sphere and it shows the general mentality of the Ottoman state system. Pamuk rightfully 
argues that the Ottoman Empire’s economic institutions were also based on 
“pragmatism, flexibility, and willingness to compromise” that enabled first persisting 
then growing of the Empire contrary to its contemporaries.
146
 The administration of the 
non-Muslim segments of the Empire was reflecting a similar strategy. Barkey argues 
that: 
“Imperial state–periphery relationships are not direct relationships between state 
and individual subjects; rather, intermediate bodies, networks, and elites mediate 
the relationships. Therefore, the authority relations flow from the central state to 
the local elites and from them to the local populations. Imperial power, then, has 
a crucially negotiated character, where different negotiations emerge from sets 
of relations in which state actors and elite groups are engaged.”147 
 
In addition to the state-periphery relations, the administrative connection 
between individual non-Muslims and state was provided through intermediate bodies of 
community organizations. In this section, the administrative relations between the non-
Muslim communities and the state in pre-Tanzimat era will be analyzed.  
Before going into the administrative structure, the words that are used to refer 
non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire should be overviewed. As Ortaylı 
points out, the word millet in Ottoman language did not have the same meaning as 
today. The Arabic term could only be used to describe “community”148 and it is used in 
this study referring to this meaning. Therefore, it is important to note that “millet” was 
only referring to religious groups and it was containing different ethnic and linguistic 
identities altogether. Muslim community was containing Turks, Arabs, Albanians and 
Muslim communities the other parts of the Empire regardless of their ethnic origins. 
Similarly, Greek (Rum milleti), Armenian (Ermeni milleti) and Jewish millets (Yahudi 
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milleti) were based on the same logic. It is crucial to note that Greek here does not 
points to an ethnic origin but rather it refers to the Orthodox sect of Christianity. To 
illustrate, Bulgarian Orthodox groups were considered within the Greek millet.
149
 
İçduygu and Soner argue that “it was in this religiously determined legal–political and 
cultural context that the imperial order (nizam) incorporated a policy of ethno lingual 
indifference in its administrative policies”.150 Although cultural and linguistic 
differences remained, until nineteenth century they were not come to forefront.  
Although the millet system conceptualization regarding the administration of the 
non-Muslim subjects of the Empire is mainly taken for granted in the literature, 
critiques were also directed. Braude argues that the terms “millet” was not typically 
used for non-Muslim communities prior to the nineteenth century but it is used today 
for all the periods. He remarks that one of the results of this misuse is the 
misunderstanding of the entire system.
151
 Braude argues that the millet system 
originated from a combination of myths. According to him, Greeks, Armenians and 
Jews were claiming that Mehmed II had close ties with their communities respectively. 
Yet these stories were contradicting with the practices and the norms of the 
communities. He makes a comparison with Islamic traditions: 
“Just as devout Muslims ascribed all sorts of traditions to the Prophet and his 
Companions, so eager dhimmis sought all sorts of tolerant acts in the behavior of 
Mehmed. Thus there grew a self-serving patina of tradition which colored the 
foundation accounts of each religious community.”152 
 
Braude concludes his discussion with the arguments that the Ottomans had no 
consistent policy toward non-Muslims over centuries and when it was began to emerge 
accompanied with the mythmaking which create justifications with the new policies.
153
 
Anagnostopulu states that in line with the argumentation of Braude, even the term millet 
is started to be used in nineteenth century. She argues that the institutialization of 
division of the millets in the nineteenth century is an Ottoman necessity and it is a part 
of the new political and social realities. In this new Ottoman world, “middle religious-
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ethnic realms” provide millets to join Ottoman institutional structure and ensures the 
parallel realms that ensure legitimacy of Ottoman rule.
154
 
Kenanoğlu points out to the conceptualization of the religious community 
administration as autonomous and discusses the questionable position of patriarchs or 
chief rabbis’ imperium in imperio (state within a state) description in the literature. He 
argues that rather than a completely different system with autonomous millets, it was 
another form of an iltizam system in which religious leaders of the communities 
executed the duty similar to mültezim in administrative, financial and penal issues of the 
communities.
155
 
The theoretical debates related to the millet system and its questionable existence 
requires further research. However, reducing the system into a discursive level based on 
the name frequency is problematic. The Ottoman administration may not give a certain 
name to the administration of non-Muslim subjects but one should avoid from the 
conclusive arguments based on discursive works. As it could be seen in the next part of 
this study, there was a legal system in pre-reform era whether it has a specific name or 
not, set of legal practices regulated lives of non-Muslim populations in Ottoman 
territory and its pragmatist side should not be forgotten. Furthermore, it should kept in 
mind that the origin of the system is the zimmet pact which was based on secondary 
status in exchange for state protection. Next part is reserved to these practices in pre-
Tanzimat era.  
2.1.2  Legal Rights and Obligations of Zımmis 
 
First of all, terms that are used to denote zımmis in the empire should be noted. 
Regarding the whole Ottoman society, the Ottoman term was tebaa. As Lewis explains, 
the origin of the word comes from Arabic tabi’ and it meant the active participle of the 
verb “to follow”. He argues that: 
“In classical Ottoman administrative language, it was the normal term indicating 
‘subordination’ and ‘dependence’, and could be used equally of persons, places 
and offices. (…) In the course of nineteenth century, as the Ottoman Empire 
joined the ‘concert of Europe’ and became more and more involved in the 
diplomatic and other conventions which governed the relations between 
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European powers, tabi’ acquired a new usage, becoming the Ottoman equivalent 
of the English word ‘subject’. In other words it denoted what we nowadays call 
nationality or citizenship”.156 
 Zımmi was common at first but then the word reaya started to be used although 
earlier it was referring to the entire Ottoman subjects.
157
 In the opinions of the people 
who were recorded in the spy reports generally refers to the non-Muslim Ottoman 
communities as reaya. The word “millet” is also problematic in nineteenth century since 
it has many connotations. Erdem indicates that in Mahmudian times, the word has at 
least five different meanings that vary from the traditional use related to non-Muslims 
led by a patriarch and subjected to zımmi status to denote a specific tribe or ethnic group 
without paying attention either to religion or to the political aspirations of that ethnic 
group.
158
 The late nineteenth century differs in contextual sense. The terms Osmanlı 
milleti or millet-i Osmaniyan were used to denote the Ottoman subjects as a single 
political entity without making any religious differentiation.
159
 This coinage was in line 
with the Ottomanism doctrine of the time.  
In general, Shaw indicates, the Sultan and the dominant class around him limited 
their jurisdiction over non-Muslim communities in administration, public finances and 
military; whereas all other issues that were a part of state such as education, 
communication, social security and law were left to the communal organizations.
160
 
Nevertheless, concerning the legal issues that are related to society in general could be 
differentiated. Regarding the family law, zımmis were allowed to be judged according to 
their own religious jurisdiction. To illustrate, marriages and divorces among zımmis 
could be executed by the religious leaders of the communities. However, along with the 
other issues that were considered within the limits of the private law, they could apply 
to the kadı who were the judges of the Shari’a courts especially for the cases that 
involve financial conflicts resulted from divorce.
161
 On the contrary to the private law 
applications, for criminal issues the Ottoman administration did not leave room for 
choice to the involved zımmi individuals. Zımmis were judged according to the Islamic 
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penal code. However, under some circumstances religious community leaders could 
demand punishment from the central state.
162
  
The clothing of zımmis was also differentiated from Muslims. Muslims were 
wearing yellow quilted turbans (kavuk) and shoes, Armenians had red hats and shoes 
whereas Greeks used black and Jews were wearing blue accessories.
163
 It is important to 
note that as Kenanoğlu argues the regulations related to the limitations over clothing, 
horse-riding and carrying weapon are not Shari’a features but customary (örfi) 
practices.
164
 However, since these are related to the public appearances and easy to 
recognize in daily life, it could be argued that they have also a symbolic meaning in 
terms of hierarchical society order.   
Regarding the obligations of non-Muslims to the Ottoman state, the crucial one 
was taxation. Poll tax (cizye) was exclusive for zımmis and it was collected in return for 
exemption from military duties. The males aged from 14 to 75 were considered as poll 
taxpayers. Cizye was collected as maktu (total) or alerrüs (per person). In addition, the 
residents of İstanbul and Sacred Sites were also exempted from the poll tax. Bozkurt 
argues that exemption from the military duty which was mandatory for Muslims was 
highly advantageous for zımmis. They did not join in wars and they could engage in arts 
and trade. Thanks to this exemption, she indicates, they could dominate the Ottoman 
trade.
165
 Another tax that was only collected from zımmis was tribute tax (haraç). Haraç 
refers to a tax that was collected from zımmi landholders in order for them to make use 
of the land that they were possessing before the Ottoman conquest. This tax was 
collected over land (harac-i muvazzafa) and products (harac-ı mukaseme) in kind.166 
The equivalent of this tax for Muslims was called öşür.  
Many other legal codes and nizamnames could also be mentioned here but a 
more detailed study will go beyond the purpose of this thesis. However, for the 
background purposes, it should be noted that in legal terms there was a clear distinction 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in many spheres including daily life. However, 
when the kadı system was considered, the individualistic judgments were also the case. 
As Davison points out, in the classical legal system of the Empire in pre-Tanzimat 
                                                          
162
 Kenanoğlu, “Osmanlı Millet Sistemi”, p.224 
163
 Bozkurt, “Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu”  p. 19 
164
 Kenanoğlu, “Osmanlı Millet Sistemi”, p.23. 
165
 Bozkurt, “Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu” , p. 23 
166
 Ibid., p. 26 
48 
 
period was that “law was personal rather than territorial in its basis and that religion 
rather than domicile or political allegiance determined the law under which an 
individual lived”.167 
 
2.2 Transformations in the Nineteenth Century: The Influence of Tanzimat 
 
 The nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire has been described as “the long 
nineteenth century” in the literature together with other contemporary empires in the 
world. It was not considered a “century” in numerical terms, but it is a qualitative 
understanding since it is neither possible nor desirable to make superficial distinctions 
regarding the political history. Therefore, the term “nineteenth century” actually refers 
to a period that starts in late eighteenth century and ends in 1914 with the beginning of 
World War I. With the World War I, the Ottoman Empire passed through a new phase 
that could be described and analyzed in a different outlook. Due to the practical reasons 
and main question of this thesis, the focus will be on the transformations in the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire in the framework of Gülhane and Reform Edicts 
with a special focus on the lives of the communities. 
2.2.1 Ottomanism Policy 
 It was mentioned in some parts of the first chapter that both Gülhane and 
Reform Edicts were based on the idea of Ottomanism (Osmanlıcılık). It constituted the 
ideological base of the reform movements started by the central bureaucracy. Before 
analyzing the transformations, this ideological doctrine should be reviewed. 
Ottomanism refers to an ideal that political, legal and social equality of tebaa living in 
Ottoman territory without having discriminated by ethnic or religious identities under 
the sovereignty of the Sultan. It is an ideology based on a single Ottoman community. 
Ottomanism policy which started in 1830s was a series of pragmatic applications at 
first, yet after 1868 it was subjected to deliberate ideological formulations.
168
 Like many 
other policies of the Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism was also a response to the changing 
and alerting circumstances. Regarding the internal dynamics, the Ottoman elite were 
evaluating the regressing of the Empire as state’s loss of control over the society and tax 
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sources respectively.
169
 1789 French Revolution and the ideas spread the world through 
it was influential especially in the Balkan territories of the Empire. The rising tide of 
nationalism was posing danger to the multiethnic structure of the Empire. Thus, 
problem of loyalty to the state became forefront. In order to put the genie back in the 
bottle, the first and foremost dichotomy had to change: the one between the Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities as well as the state-society dynamics.  
The other reason behind the policy could be seen with respect to modernization 
period that the Ottoman Empire was experiencing. Thanks to modern technology, the 
central state could reach out the areas that were de facto autonomous and created a 
struggle between them and the central administration.
170
 Somel indicates that for such a 
political project that accepts society as an indiscriminative whole, three reference points 
could be made.  First one could be creating a loyalty focus by attributing religious 
sanctity to state and an institution, party or a ruler. Secondly, it could be achieved 
through using the discourse of patriotism over the sanctity of the land where people 
coexisted together in order to create a mutual emotion that could unite people. Lastly, it 
could be generated secular nation based on a supra-identity which is beyond religious 
and ethnic differences. Regarding the post-1830 period, it could be argues that Ottoman 
policies concentrated on the first one with a strong emphasis on state and 
centralization.
171
  
 However, the problem was that especially the Reform Edict of 1856 created 
segregations on the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims although the aim was 
to unite. Serbestoğlu indicates that Ottomanism as a result of the efforts to prevent 
dissolution and constituted a secular identity instilled non-Muslims to bond with their 
communities over ethnic ties rather than religious ones. By this way, in the age of 
nationalism, while the Ottoman Empire was trying to create its own nation beyond 
religious configuration, it sharpens the differences in terms of ethnicity.
172
 Regarding 
the expressions and developments after the Gülhane Edict and especially Reform Edict, 
this problem reaches significance. Davison argues that:  
                                                          
169
 Şerif Mardin, "19. Yy'da Düşünce Akınları ve Osmanlı Devleti" in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 343. 
170
 Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Osmanlıcılık" in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, Vol. V. 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1390. 
171
 Somel,  “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi”, p. 91-92 
172
 İbrahim Serbestoğlu, Osmanlı Kimdir? Osmanlı Devleti'nde Tabiiyet Sorunu (İstanbul: Yeditepe 
Yayınevi, 2014), 48. 
50 
 
 
“Yet there was a dualism implicit in the fact that the Hatt-ı Humayun, with all its 
emphasis on equality without distinction as to religion, was in part devoted to 
enumerating the rights of the Christian and other non-Muslim communities, and 
specifically retained the millet organizations, although prescribing their reform. 
Millet boundaries were to be blurred, but they were still there. Complete 
equality, egalitarian Ottomanism, was yet to come, even in theory.”173 
 
 
2.2.2 Political Transformations in the Tanzimat Era 
 
 As it was indicated in the first chapter of this work, the Gülhane Edict were 
filled with promises that does not pose great changes in the practical sphere as well as 
theoretical sense. However, it was perceived both by the elites themselves and the 
population as a grand change in both political and social spheres. Nevertheless, the 
Reform Edict was the crucial one that has “revolutionary” changes, if one of them has 
to be chosen. In terms of Muslim and non-Muslim relations, Gülhane Edict did not 
bring significant changes although even Mustafa Reşid Pasha was afraid of the 
reactions. He was so disturbed that he thought his life was in danger when he was 
reading the Edict to public.
174
 Although there was no significant change in the Edict, 
some reforms were conducted during the Tanzimat era.  
The main changes were related to administrative and taxation issues. As pointed 
out by İnalcık, the influence and responsibilities of the governors were diminished, the 
members of the kadı organization were connected to the center more strictly and new 
assemblies were established in districts. Regarding the assemblies, if there were non-
Muslim population in a certain district they would be also represented. Regarding 
taxation issues, new government officials namely muhassıls were appointed to directly 
collect taxes in order to reduce the influence and abuse of the governors and local 
notables.
175
 The removal of iltizam system was emphasized in the Edict clearly with the 
description of “trouble”. However, this new direct taxation system including muhassıls 
was abandoned in 1842 since salaries exceeded the amount of tax. Furthermore, the 
order related to the election of “sensible and distinguished people” in the regions led to 
notables took advantage of the system again at the disadvantage of the peasants. Non-
Muslim members were also complaining that they were being ignored in the assemblies 
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in İstanbul.176 As it can be seen, these fiscal reforms were pointing to centralization. 
However, the assemblies were open to discussion mainly due to its practicality and 
applicability.  
In terms of military duties, there was no certain expression regarding the non-
Muslim subjects. However, it was mainly considered by the existing literature that the 
phrase stating sending soldiers for protection for homeland is a debt for people 
(muhafaza-i vatan için asker vermek ahalinin fariza-i zimmetidir)
177
 is a call for each 
Ottoman subject without distinguishing between Muslims and non-Muslims concerning 
the general tune of the Edict. Nevertheless, in Gülhane Edict, the stress is over the 
irregularities and the problems during the recruitment process and service and again 
there is no reference to equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. On the contrary, 
one of the most significant parts of the Reform Edict is related to the military service. 
Nevertheless, before the declaration of the Reform Edict this issue was already on the 
agenda. The urgent need of soldier and problem of population balance was influential 
on the idea. The idea of abolition of cizye came under these concerns. As Gülsoy 
argues, the state took the risk of losing an important source of revenue in order to 
reorganize the deteriorated economic and social balance with spreading the military 
duty to all of its tebaa.
178
 However, due to the problems during the practices and the 
opposition of non-Muslim reaya in Crimean War, this regulation was abandoned.
179
  
In between two Edicts, several new codes were enacted including Penal Code 
(Ceza Kanunnamesi) in 1843 and Commercial Code (Ticaret Kanunnamesi) in 1850. 
These have restricted the authority of bureaucrats in interpreting the law and established 
a secure market for trade respectively.
180
 The former also included equality in being 
witness during the trials but it took time to be effective in all country. In 1846, mixed 
trade tribunals were established in order to hear the cases between Muslims and non-
Muslims, non-Muslim intra-groups and the cases between Ottoman subjects and 
foreigners.  In 1864, in line with the legal principles in Reform Edict, Nizamiye Courts 
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were founded for the cases between Muslims and non-Muslims for the issues apart from 
Shari’a, community, trade and consulate jurisdiction.181 
As it can be seen in the aforementioned developments, Reform Edict brought 
significant changes for the inter-communal relations. The most remarkable regulation 
conducted within the years of 1862-1865, separate nizamnames for each group were 
accepted. These were considered “constitutions” by the non-Muslim communities. 
Greek Patriarch Regulation (Rum Patrikliği Nizamatı) accepted by Sublime Porte in 
1862. With this regulation, the general framework of the Greek Orthodox subjects’ 
administration was determined.
182
 The reorganization of non-Muslim communities 
brought many new realities with it; one of them was the increasing number of non-
Muslim communities to be recognized by the Ottoman state.
183
 For the Armenian 
Gregorian millet, due to the strives among the community, Ali Pasha forced the 
patriarch for a conference that includes both religious and laymen, as a result, a 
nizamname was prepared in 1863 and it provided lay participation and representative 
government for Armenian community.
184
 In 1865, nizamname was prepared for the 
Jewish community stating that the Chef Rabbi was civil and religious leader of Jews 
and an assembly shall be formed by religious and laymen.  
2.2.3 Economic Transformations 
The position of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire was not only shaped 
and changed by the internal reform movements and dynamics but also international 
economic environment. The nineteenth century also denoted the widening of 
international markets and it is not possible to consider Ottoman Empire outside of this 
flow. The industrial and military advances in the West combined with the urbanization 
and changing consumption patterns changed the trade structures. As a result, Karpat 
states, the Ottoman Empire gradually became importer and its exports gradually shrank 
to agricultural commodities by the second half of the nineteenth century.
185
  
The position of the non-Muslims is critical in this economic restructuring. With 
the changing trade dynamics and rising number of Western goods in the Ottoman 
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markets specifically affected the non-Muslim merchants on their advantage. They 
managed to retain the resources they accumulated through association with the West 
and while office and household members could not escaped from the Sultan’s control.186 
As Issawi argues, firstly, they constituted the role “entrepreneurial petty bourgeoisie” of 
the financial services and linked the European importers, exporters and banks with the 
local producers and consumers. Secondly, they possessed most of the liberal professions 
such as physicians, pharmacists, engineers, architects and lawyers. It was noted in 
earlier sections that the role of military service exemption of the non-Muslims 
accelerated and eased this process. And lastly, they formed the majority of the salaried 
middle class employed by governments or European projects of public utilities and 
industries.
187
 It is also important that employment by the foreign embassies and through 
this way using the fiscal and commercial privileges granted by the trade agreements was 
also on the rise in the nineteenth century. These non-Muslim merchants were called 
beratlı and their increasing number caused significant fiscal problems for the Ottoman 
treasury.
188
 This also created dissent among the Muslim population.  
The Tanzimat reforms and Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1838 was domestic factors 
that affect the economic position of the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. Sonyel remarks 
that Anglo-Ottoman Treaty and establishment of Armenian Protestant millet under 
Abraham Utudjiyan gave Armenians an ever increasing superior position but does not 
elaborate his argument. He also argues that Tanzimat reforms benefited Armenians 
tremendously with other non-Muslim groups. He gives place to reports of the British 
consul at Erzurum in 1848 and the consul J. Brant states that “it is remarkable that the 
purchasers of the land are universally Armenians, and the sellers almost always 
Muslims – a fact of strong significance as to the effect of the Tanzimat on the Christian 
part of the population, which is evidently raising prosperity”. He also points out to the 
observations of Adolphus Slade in 1831, who was an admiral in Ottoman navy at the 
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time, and he argues that Armenians were chief bankers of European Turkey having 
supplanted the Jews.
189
  
Pressure from Armenian middle class was strong enough to pressure Ottoman 
central government. Shaw&Shaw argue that Armenian merchants, moneylenders and 
artisans were benefited from the financial developments from 1858 and they challenged 
the notables’ political power but they failed at first due to the latter’s strong financial 
position although they gained a ferman in 1841 stated that the civil issues should be 
under the control of an elected body.
190
  For the Greek merchants, Anglo-Ottoman 
Trade Agreement of 1838 and proclamation of Gülhane Edict generated an impetus for 
Greek economic expansion in coastal and inland parts of the Western Anatolia.
191
 The 
reforms encouraged many people from newly independent Greece to Ottoman Empire. 
Sonyel indicates that it led to a dramatic increase in western Anatolia in terms of Greek 
presence and wealth during the nineteenth century.
192
 Regarding the Jewish population 
in economic terms, Jews played an important role until eighteenth century but they were 
lagged behind their Greek and Armenian competitors in all the decisive sectors such as 
trade, banking, manufacture, crafts and learned professions later as indicated by 
Dumont.
193
 Yet, it should be considered within the non-Muslim community groups.  
The political and economic changes intermingled in many ways in the daily lives 
of the non-Muslims. However, it is neither possible nor preferable to perceive these 
changes regarding only a certain segment of the Ottoman population. Although the 
weight of this chapter is upon the lives of non-Muslims, the opposite conditions could 
be implemented for Muslim communities. Of course there were differentiations 
regarding the Muslim groups as well. Overall, the central state became more powerful 
through its strong mechanisms such as bureaucracy and extended its control over 
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society more deeply than ever.
194
 Yet regarding the first phase of the Tanzimat era the 
political and legal changes mostly affected the non-Muslim groups. Turgay argues that: 
“In other words, while foreign trade was largely responsible for having 
stimulated the growth of Ottoman economy and the modernization of the cities, 
the same economic factor was responsible for intensifying social differentiation 
among the various ethnic groups in the state, particularly in port cities. Indeed, 
the sum of these economic developments and subsequent social changes was to 
stimulate ethnic consciousness on the side of both Muslims and Christians. In 
fact, the non-Muslim merchants, anxious to express their economic power in 
political terms, effectuated constitutional and structural changes in their 
respective millet systems.”195  
The next chapter will be reserved to the public opinion formation during the 
Tanzimat era with a special emphasis upon the period after the proclamation of the 
Gülhane Edict in 1839. The theoretical and historical background presented in the first 
two chapters will generate a fruitful basis for the understanding of the value judgment 
formation, opinions of the non-elite segments of the society and the possible reasons 
behind the formation process.  
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CHAPTER III 
VOICE OF “THE SILENT”: NON-ELITE REACTIONS TO TANZIMAT 
 
“Everyday life consisted of the little things one hardly notices in time and 
space… The event is, or is taken to be unique; the everyday happening is 
repeated and the more often is repeated the more likely it is become a generality 
or rather a structure. It pervades society at all levels, and characterizes ways of 
being and behaving which are perpetuated through endless ages.”196  
This quotation from Braudel could be used as a good inception point to 
understand the formation of public opinion in the 19
th
 century Ottoman world since it is 
not convenient to use modern definitions of public opinion. What is meant by modern 
definition of public opinion in here is that they are mostly related with democracy and 
its derivatives and more importantly commonly related with elections and polls.  
If it is not applicable to the pre-modern in transition societies, then how is it 
supposed to understand the reactions of the population concerning societies such as 
Ottoman society? Ben-Bassat summarizes a definition of public opinion that is also 
useful for the nineteenth century Ottoman case stating that public opinion is “the 
outcome of a collective behavior in which participants discuss an issue known to a 
wider audience”.197 He also adds that using the term public opinion would not be 
appropriate until the final decades of nineteenth century for Ottoman society. Many 
changes and developments brought by reforms and diffusion of new ideas such as 
liberty and equality contributed to foster changes in the expression of public opinion at 
least in urban areas.
198
 Although Bassat’s argument could be considered accurate 
regarding the more organized form of public opinion was the case in the final decades 
of nineteenth century; it would not be realistic to claim that there was no public opinion 
in the earlier decades.  
Although there is a clear distinction between mere opinion and public opinion in 
Habermasian sense, Kırlı argues that “every individual opinion articulated in a public 
setting incited comment from others, then further disseminated through the word of 
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mouth, and ultimately contributed to the formation of public opinion”.199 An analysis of 
public opinion in a case such as Ottoman society could only be based on repeating and 
spreading little opinions that became generality to a certain extent rather than as an 
expression of rational and joint standing against a particular political change.  
One indicator of the existence of public opinion regarding Ottoman case in 
earlier decades could be given as the mosques, coffeehouses, barbershops, public baths, 
local bazaars etc. as the public spaces in where people come together and produce 
opinions related to Ottoman state and society. The foremost proof of the public 
circulation of opinions could be seen in the reaction of the state to these potentially 
“dangerous” public spaces. In this sense, coffeehouses became the first target of the 
central administration. As Akyazıcı Özkoçak states, coffeehouses were conceived as 
places in where provoking gossips were produced, dissents were shaped, expressed and 
directed. This potential alarmed the central state and during the first half of the 
seventeenth century coffeehouses tried to be controlled through closures.
200
 However, 
they were opened up in the later periods. Other public spaces were also under control 
through state officials in disguise (tebdil) and there were even female “spies” in the 
public baths which were the places that women could only meet outside.
201
 The state’s 
control over the conversations related to state affairs were changing according to the 
ruler’s and bureaucratic elites’ perception.202 However, rather than explaining the 
perception according to the ruler’s character, it would be convenient to argue that it was 
mainly related to the state mentality and administrative practices as Kırlı proposes.203  
The Ottoman state elite also considered public opinion carefully. The 
perspective of Cevdet Pasha is a good illustration. Neumann indicates that for Cevdet 
Pasha public opinion is the only source of power that could be greater than the ruler. In 
some countries it reveals itself openly but in some countries such as Ottoman Empire it 
is hidden and sometimes it shows itself through rebellions and revolutions. However, 
Cevdet Pasha sees the public opinion not as a part of politics but as a danger posed 
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against it.
204
 However, this perception was changed in the later periods until the reign of 
Abdulhamid II and it was more based on trying to understand the public opinion by the 
central administration rather than controlling the public.  
When reactions of the people against certain political changes or ongoing state 
practices are considered, it could be rightfully argued that the most certain form of them 
are rebellions. The Serbian Rebellion and the Greek War of Independence were partially 
resulted from dissent against the state. To illustrate, as indicated in the first chapter of 
this thesis, the Serbian Revolt was broke out due to the maladministration of the 
Ottoman rule rather than as an independence movement. Uzun indicates that regarding 
the Revolt of Niş (1841) reaya was pointing to the problems of taxation and 
maladministration of the local officials as the cause of the conflict.
205
 Similarly, 
although the Bulgarian subjects of the Empire were experiencing preliminary national 
awakenings thanks to the economic progress and national education movement in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, they would not find the power for a war of liberation 
as stated by İnalcık. Additionally, the Sublime Porte was not able to carry out the 
promises that it made with Tanzimat. These created a growing dissent among the 
Bulgarians and various rebellion attempts were also seen until the Revolt of Vidin in 
1850.
206
 The peasant uprisings in Canik (1840s-1860s) and Kisrawan (1858-1861) 
reflected the attitude of the people in the Ottoman Empire to the upper classes and to the 
state.
207
 Overall, these revolts also show the reactions of the people which were 
reflected in physical terms. This thesis aims to concentrate upon the reactions which 
were not transformed to physical revolts but stayed at the discursive level.  
The opinions regarding the state-society relations stand as unimportant 
individual expressions, but then they become “publicized” through circulating. 
Regarding the definitions of public opinion formation and change, its strong relation 
with “transformations in public structure, economic and political reform and 
technological advances” that societies experienced is valid throughout the time as 
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argued by Herbst
208
 but as it is argued above for the Ottoman case of nineteenth century 
public opinion analysis requires a different outlook. In this sense, regarding the fact that 
the reforms of nineteenth century Ottoman Empire commonly known as Tanzimat 
reforms shows a clear example of the transformations that Herbst point out and they 
should stimulated a significant change in the public opinion. Ozouf investigates the 
public opinion of the people right after French Revolution of 1789 and she defines the 
process as the expression of individuals in terms of approval to an action within a group 
“regular enough to serve as a reference for a specific political project”. Public opinion 
does not only operate against the absolutism. She also points out to the modern link that 
it has.
209
 It is important to recognize that formation of the public opinion against a 
certain political change cannot be only in the form of reaction, the approval side should 
also be examined. Furthermore, she analyses a period where political organization is 
strong, in this sense it is not directly parallel with the early phase of the Ottoman reform 
but rather appropriate with the later phases as Ben-Bassat argues.  
During the second half of the nineteenth century, newspapers started to 
constitute the core of organized public opinion. The newspapers such as Tercüman-ı 
Ahval (1860) and Tasvir-i Efkar (1861) together with other examples published many 
articles in every respect and fulfilled the duty of establishing public opinion 
successfully.
210
 These newspapers were highly important in the sense that they 
contributed to the spread of new ideas within the Ottoman public opinion and 
constituted a more organized form of idea flows. To illustrate, Tasvir-i Efkar, published 
by Şinasi who was a prominent figure for Young Turk ideas, became a forum for the 
discussions related to new political and literary ideas.
211
 The articles were focused 
around economic, social and political discussions from different perspectives varying 
between conservative and progressive considerations until 1873 but in 1873 when İbret 
newspaper was closed and its authors were sent to exile newspapers started to focus on 
European military and political affairs rather than the domestic issues.
212
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The standing of public opinion in the final phase of the nineteenth century was 
remarkable. Although not as organized as this period, the early Tanzimat era public 
opinion which was based on the unorganized circulation of the reactions also requires a 
closer look since they constitute the inception and core of the opinions, ideas and 
organizations in the later period as well as affecting the state-society relations of the 
time. As Farge argues,  
“Words spoken and opinions pronounced could open up distances, cause 
displacements and organize something which was new to the spheres of saying 
and doing; and that is how we must take them, in the place where they were 
born, at the heart of the situations from which they sprang”.213  
This chapter will be based on the detailed examination of the spy reports 
collected in İstanbul between the dates of 1840-1844 revealed and analyzed by Cengiz 
Kırlı within a different framework of public space and social control. Among many 
other interesting clues related to the Ottoman public opinion in İstanbul during 
nineteenth century, the focus of this study will be on the inter-communal relations and 
the effects of the recently released legal document of the period, the Gülhane Edict. The 
reports will be analyzed according to both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. I should 
note that the translations were made by me. Along with the examination, views that are 
mentioned in the literature will also be compared in order to have a more accurate 
perception. While the beginning of this chapter will try to understand and evaluate the 
reaction to the changes; the next parts will be about the analysis of the possible reasons 
behind the value judgments expressed in the reports. As a result, this work aims to try to 
shed a light upon the public opinion formation in the nineteenth century İstanbul.  
3.1 The Muslim Reactions 
3.1.1 “The Invention of Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye 
 In one of the reports, there is an interesting phrase as following:  
Hüseyin Ağa and Ahmed Ağa are talking to each other: “reaya is rebelling 
everywhere, before it was not possible for them to go out. It is not their fault; the 
fault belongs to us. Ever since Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye was invented, there is no 
fear from the officials. It is not that surprising.”214 
 
They conceptualize the reforms as an invention. As indicated earlier, the reports 
are collected between the years of 1840-1844. Hence, what they were referring as 
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“Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye” is the Gülhane Edict of 1839. In the earlier chapters, it was 
indicated that a careful analysis shows that the promises in Gülhane Edict does not 
bring a grand change in terms of daily lives of the people contrary to the Reform Edict. 
The protection of life, property and honor is significant but in theory it is not completely 
diverted from the Islamic understanding of rule and justice. Rather than a “revolution”, 
one may argue, it points to a restoration period. The introduction of the Edict verifies 
this perception. It mentions to the “good old days” when the Ottoman Empire was 
experiencing its glorious days but it started to decline. It needs such a restoration that it 
could go back to these glorious days and reach its old prosperity level once again. The 
administrative reforms would be undertaken in line with this arguments and protection 
of life, honor and property is also a branch of this outlook. However, a broker from 
Nemçe, İstefaki, also makes a similar judgment:  
“The security forces do not pay attention since Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye was 
invented but there are many bad manners in İstanbul.”215  
 
Selim Ağa from Taşköprü also argues that the state invented the Tanzimat.216 
Apart from the other judgments that can be pointed out in different contexts, the usage 
of the word invention (icad olunmak) here is highly interesting. It is also worth to note 
that “icad etmek/olunmak” has also a pejorative meaning in Ottoman language in line 
with the usage and meaning in modern Turkish. The Ottoman-English Lexicon explains 
the word “icad” as causing to exist; creating; invention, creation, production; Redhouse 
adds meanings as trumping up and fabricating for “icad etmek”. “İcad çıkarmak” is 
used for abandoning a good habit. The phrases are used as “icad edilmek” in the reports 
but they are used in a negative context. Although it is neither possible nor preferable to 
generalize Muslim public opinion regarding Tanzimat reforms as an “invention”, the 
general mood of the Muslim reactions towards the novelties brought by them reflects a 
negative attitude considering the changes. This labeling gives little clues about the 
Muslim public opinion towards Tanzimat reforms. Although it does not bring anything 
“brand new” in the daily lives and there is no reference of “invention” in the text of 
Gülhane Edict, why do the Muslim people describe it as an invention? The answer 
could not only be in the political and practical spheres due to the explanations in 
question. Therefore, it should be searched in the minds of the people. It is a 
psychological reaction combined with the material changes. The possible causes of 
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these description and the reactions in overall sense will be investigated in later parts of 
this thesis after the analysis of the concerning spy reports was conducted one by one in 
order to have the general tune of the reactions.    
 
 Turning back to the conversation between Hüseyin Ağa and Ahmet Ağa, they 
talk about the changes in the social order. They argue that non-Muslims would not dare 
to go out let alone rebelling. Pointing out to pre-reform period, they state that non-
Muslims “could not go out before”. It is clear that they are bothered by the increasing 
public visibility of the non-Muslims and they interpret it as the breakdown of old social 
hierarchy implicitly.
217
 In terms of rebelling, it is quite likely that they have the 
nationalist riots in the Balkans at the background of their minds. The dramatic effects of 
the secessionist movements in the Balkans are effective to shape opinions regarding 
non-Muslim issues. They are uncomfortable with the idea of changing power dynamics 
in the society in terms of Muslim and non-Muslim relations. The phrase “the fault 
belongs to us” is also significant in a sense that it shows identification with the state. As 
Muslims, they see themselves as the ones who are much closer to the Ottoman state, the 
core of political power. They talk as if the changing conditions were created by 
themselves, not something superior to them. The responsible factor to blame for these 
changing conditions is the “auspicious” Tanzimat reforms. They see that the “invention” 
of Tanzimat changed the social and political order at the advantage of non-Muslims.  
 
Another report which is highly interested and related to both inter-communal 
relations and social order is as following from Kasımpaşalı Abdurrahman Ağa: 
“We cannot have any other profit from Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye. Croatians are 
sacking our houses and they do not have fear of death. From now on I will do 
such a thing that we will see what is going to happen. I will fight with a reaya 
and kill him. If they ask me the reason I will reply that there is no death in 
Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye so I killed him. I will tell anyone who comes to me.”218 
  
 The expression of anger and exaggeration derived from it is remarkable. He 
interpreted the judicial issues in Gülhane Edict as if there will be no death penalty for 
crimes committed anymore. He also describes himself as “we” in line with the 
identification of the self as Muslim with the state and creating climate that was based on 
“us vs. them”.  Deringil argues that “the Tanzimat state was primarily the first and last 
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attempt of the Ottoman ruling class to extend an invitation to its non-Muslim subjects to 
become true citizens, as the term reaya increasingly came to mean “subject” as in 
“British subject”, eventually to be replaced by teba, meaning citizen.219 Muslims are 
consciously or unconsciously aware of this fact and gave negative reactions since they 
identify themselves as the group who has the power in pre-Tanzimat era.  
“Soldiers from sea forces heard about church bell and state that “even if the 
Great Palace is here and these infidels ringing bells. When will the God let us to 
make them suffer a lot? Look at the heads of the children; they are wearing 
green, as if the emirate belongs to them now.”220 
 What we see in here is the expression of anger due to the destruction of a static 
hierarchy in the eyes of Muslims that was at the disadvantage of non-Muslims. They are 
reacting to the church bell which is a direct symbol and it distinguishes itself in the eyes 
of these soldiers. Under normal circumstances, there was Muslim toleration for “people 
of the book” (ehl-i kitab) and it refers to believers such as Christians and Jews who 
possess a book of divine revelation.
221
 However, the balance is about to broken now 
considering the changing political and social climate.  
They are also pointing to a “dissent” that these bells are ringing even they are 
near to the Great Palace which is another symbol in terms of state and indirectly Muslim 
authority. Barkey points out that in Islamic empires religion was part of a political 
legitimacy. A Sultan was able to expand, maintain and protect the realm as well as 
fighting the enemies of Islam with a result of bringing supremacy to the Muslims was 
part of the religious and political legitimacy.
222
 They see it as something disrespectful 
firstly to the state and secondly to the Muslims. There is a clear association with the 
state power and being Muslim. Furthermore, they refer to the clothing code which is an 
indicator of the legal regulations of the pre-Tanzimat era. The remarkable point is that 
they see clothing code as a concrete reflection of the hierarchy and they attach it to 
political power in the form of the word “emirate”. Regarding the classical form of millet 
system, the dress code was different for non-Muslims. Quataert points to the social 
reflections of these laws as “clothing laws since early times served as important 
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indicators of social mobility and marked out the differences among officials, between 
officials and the subject classes and also among the subjects”.223  
The legal superiority in material sense is undoubtly interpreted as social and 
political superiority by Muslims. The color green and the word emirate merge together 
as the signs of Muslims’ political power at the symbolic level. Therefore, they argue 
that the political power passed to the non-Muslims from Muslims in the social realm. As 
a result, they reflect a clear hostility against non-Muslims and seek opportunity to turn 
this hostility into violent action. Pandey argues that “there is a violence written into the 
making and continuation of contemporary political arrangements, and into the 
production and reproduction of majorities and minorities” and she calls this condition as 
“routine violence”.224 At this point, physical violence is not that common in inter-
communal relations but some steps of “routine violence” which will turn into physical 
violence show itself in this early period. The mutual interest in interethnic peace was the 
case although there was a potential
225
 but when the conditions changed and the interests 
were damaged potential started to felt itself.  
The butler of kadi of Salonika, İsmail, states that “(…) Since Tanzimat-ı 
Hayriyye showed up, you cannot talk with reaya. They were very spoilt.”226 
This expression is slightly different from the previous one in the sense that he 
feels humiliated by non-Muslims to a certain extent. He refers to them as reaya. As 
indicated before, although the term reaya was used for all subjects of the empire in 
earlier centuries, in the later periods it was started to be used only for non-Muslim 
groups. In his eyes, now non-Muslims see themselves as superior than Muslims and 
they do not talk to them as they were doing before. He points out to change in the 
behavior of the non-Muslims in an arrogant form and determines the source of change 
as the reforms brought by Tanzimat just like many other Muslims. Again, this reaction 
should also be considered within the historical context that the empire was 
experiencing.  
Tatar Küçük Mustafa and Tatar Ahmed are talking to each other: “There were no 
reaya houses in here but now they are everywhere. The infidels invaded all these 
places. Before, it was their place and now they acquired again. Even in 
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Dersaadet
227
, they are seizing quarters gradually. We will see how will end this 
process.”228  
This was also a reflection of attributed inferiority of non-Muslims compared to 
Muslims and changing hands of social superiority. Non-Muslims are again called as 
reaya here and in addition they are also labeled as “infidels” (kafirler). They are 
differentiating between “us” and “them”. There is a clear marginalization in here. 
Barkey argues that “Muslims, who were expected to be the warrior class of the empire 
with special privileges attached to their superior status, were bound to be disappointed 
by the inclusion of others”.229 It is not a problem of status degradation of status for the 
Muslims; rather it is a problem that stems from equalization of the excluded groups to 
their status.  
Using the term of infidels also shows an Islamic comparison. As Lewis argues, 
the outsider in Islam is defined by his rejection of Islam. The “kafir” (infidel or 
unbeliever) is the one who does not believe in the apostolate of Prophet Mohammed and 
his revelation. All religions have descriptions to denote “the other” and for Islam the 
alien outsider and presumptive enemy is the unbeliever kafir.
230
 They are alienating one 
segment of the society that they were living in and they emphasize on an Islamic 
division. The expression also includes socio-spatial points. They mention to the spaces 
and houses that were belong to the Muslims before and argue that non-Muslims were 
spreading to the considering area. The use of phrase “istila eylemek” is remarkable here. 
They are simply accusing non-Muslims to invade and occupy something they do not 
have the right to have and express anger. Another reading that can be pointed out in the 
text is related to the economic sphere. They might remark to the potential of the 
increasing economic activity of the non-Muslims. The superiority-inferiority problem 
comes to light not only at the psychological level; it has also economic dimensions as 
well such as the following example: 
Coffeeshop owner İbrahim Ağa states in a conversation:  
“The rent of the grocery was eighty guruş but now Armenians increased it to one 
hundred and fifty guruş. The store above the candy maker was increased from 
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twenty five guruş to fifty guruş. On this line there left only three Muslim stores, 
most of them were invaded by Armenians.”231 
 The increase in the rent was related by Muslims to non-Muslim economic 
activity. Again, non-Muslims, Armenians specifically, are accused to “invade” the 
stores and decreasing Muslim existence was underlined. Barkey argues that 
commercialization of the empire led to politization of the communities differently.
232
 
This relatively small example is a result of bigger economic scale that both parties were 
experiencing but Muslims were considering themselves to be at the disadvantaged side 
in economic terms.  
A quarantine guard states that “The reaya could not wear fur before; even if they 
do, they could not go out with it. In this distribution, the fur was for reaya but 
simple cloths were left to us. If there will be another distribution, I do not know 
what will be our share this time”.233 
There is again an implicit social hierarchy embedded within the symbol of 
clothing and increasing public visibility. Yet here, the change in the hierarchy observed 
as being upside down. Rather than being equalized, there is an unbalanced social 
positioning. In addition to the change in social hierarchy, the economic restructuring for 
the benefit of non-Muslims is also effective behind the formation of opinions here. 
Wearing fur refers to both socio-political and economic value judgments comparing to 
wearing simple cloths. Hence, this report could be interpreted both in legalistic and 
symbolic terms over the old clothing prohibitions within the framework of 
administration of non-Muslims and socio-economic levels. Reforms are not mentioned 
directly in the report but what distribution meant is in here are the new changes brought 
by Tanzimat reforms. There is also a pessimistic outlook in the report in the sense that 
firstly they expect the continuation of the reforms. It is not impossible confront a new 
reform edict and their expectation realized later with the Reform Edict in 1856. 
Secondly, the concessions to the non-Muslims, as they are interpreted by the Muslims in 
the reports, will likely to continue in a way that the prestige of the Muslims is quite 
likely to be lowered if there will be any other regulation. They feel themselves insecure 
and vulnerable to the potential reforms and they express resentment accordingly.   
The coffee seller Bekir and oil seller Hafız are talking to each other as 
“Armenians are wearing hats and they are becoming Europeans, I do not know what 
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happened to them. Armenian millet came to İstanbul in order to wipe the feet of ehl-i 
İslam but now they are employed for great jobs. If these people have opportunity, they 
will do everything.”234 
Here, the ones who are talking about the non-Muslim activities point out to the 
relations between the non-Muslims, which specifically induced to Armenians, and 
Europeans. They are referring to the cultural interaction again regarding wearing hats. 
They are symbolizing “being Western” and “being in power” comparison to the 
Muslims in a material form. The perception of non-Muslim inferiority is remarkable and 
reaction to the break of old social system is clear. They implicitly state that in the old 
regime they had no opportunity but when they have they will use it at the disadvantage 
of Muslims in the economic sphere. The resentment towards increasing economic 
activity of non-Muslims is pointed out. “Being employed for great jobs” is an important 
comparison for Muslims. There is also a comparison between the Ottoman and the 
European in the sense that they are accusing Armenians to be like Europeans. Barkey 
mentions to the unbalanced employment system by Europeans who start projects in the 
Empire. She argues that the employers hired cheap Muslim labor whereas manager 
positions with high salaries were filled by non-Muslim Ottomans or foreigners. This 
was an important factor for increasing interreligious tensions.
235
 
Hüseyin Ağa argues that “Before, three-four hundreds of poor were making a 
living in Feshane and pray for the sultan. Now, Europeans are making the living for 
them and they will administrate the Feshane. Islam does not have any business now and 
all of the reaya are under the authority of Europeans.”236 
In here, the dissent from the increasing influence of European actors is 
underlined. At the micro level of state-society relations, economic power that was 
belong to Islam started to changing hands according to this report. Feshane in here 
refers to the textile factory opened by Mahmud II. The effect of changing economic 
conditions is again important here in a different level. The significance of production 
units is realized and their transfer to Europeans and non-Muslims was found alarming.  
It was seen as the decline of Islam and rise of non-Muslim subjects and foreigners.  
The negative attitude held by Muslims was also mentioned in the literature. 
İnalcık argues that each group interpreted the changes differently in line with their 
interests. Muslims were dissented and the elite such as ulema, ayans and some 
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governors provoked the Muslim population. He also narrates the observations of 
Hamlin who was a first-hand witness of the responses of the people. Hamlin mentions 
to the cries of the Muslims as “the Sharia law is broken, now the Muslim and the non-
Muslim are on the same status” over the declaration of Gülhane Edict237. The elite were 
also aware of the Muslim dissent. Reşid Pasha argues that Reform Edict was sent from 
France and “people from Paris” do not know much about the Ottoman institutions. As a 
result, he continues, with the last edict Islamic fanaticism among Muslims was revived; 
Muslims started to blame Europeans since the edict was declared because of them and 
hate Russia due to the privileges they gained.
238
 Davison argues that the state elite tried 
to explain the edicts differently according to the groups. They were introduced to 
Europe and non-Muslims as a significant concession whereas the edicts were launched 
to Muslim population underlining that there is nothing new or harming Islamic prestige. 
However, these shaky expectations and promises created different realities contrary to 
the state elite’s anticipations. As Davison states, the existence of the edicts created a 
fertile ground of murmurs on both parties. While Muslims saw it as a dangerous 
concessions; Europe and non-Muslims were not happy since the promises and 
compromises were not realized. Cevdet Pasha interprets the Reform Edict as bringing 
equality in all spheres of law (kaffe-i hukukta müsavi olmak) and he argues that Muslim 
communities disturbed by this new equality. He also criticizes the Edict as “before this, 
one of the four articles in the peace (the Paris Treaty) was granting privileges to the 
non-Muslim communities with the condition of keeping the independence of the 
government. However, the issue of the privileges fell behind. In all spheres of law non-
Muslim communities (teba’a-i gayr-i müslime) became equal with Muslim communities 
(ehl-i Islam) in an instance. Most of the people from ehl-i Islam argue that ‘today we 
lost the sacred national law (hukuk-ı mukaddese-i milliyemiz) that was gained thanks to 
the blood of our ancestors. Islamic community (millet-i Islamiyye) was the dominant 
group (millet-i hakime) was now we are deprived of this sacred right. Today is the day 
for weeping and mourning for Muslims”.239 
Clearly, they were seeing themselves in a situation that the empire was 
undergoing some serious changes. Just like most of the big political changes, in their 
eyes, the balance was about to be broken on the disadvantage of them. The disadvantage 
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in here does not stem from a condition that they were experiencing a legal degradation. 
Rather, it is the form of losing superiority in a certain system. The new regime (not in 
political but in social sense) was creating its own winners and losers; and Muslims were 
feeling that they were changing position from being winner. Therefore, they responded 
accordingly. Muslim connection of clothing and superiority/authority is an interesting 
point that can be inferred from the reports. They validate the material reflections of 
authority and superiority over the clothing code. In addition, the dissident that stems 
from the increasing economic activity of non-Muslims and decrease of Muslim 
activities in economic sphere is highly effective in terms of the formation of Muslim 
public opinion. Regarding the equality idea that came to forefront with the imperial 
Edicts of Gülhane and Reform, Davison argues that “the sort of Ottoman equality at 
which the Tanzimat statesmen aimed was discredited as an idea both among Muslims 
and among Christians”. As he states, no equality of Christians and Muslim based on 
fusion and brotherhood but ‘the corporate equality of competing national sovereign 
states’ was the case concerning the public opinion at the time. However, an examination 
of the spy reports collected from non-Muslim subjects reveals a different picture.  
3.1.2 The Possible Causes of the Dissent 
The reactions by themselves are significant; however the underlying causes 
behind them are more important to understand the meaning and consider the societal 
clues to infer. An explanation could be found in the very basic Islamic understanding of 
bid’at. Davison argues that promotion of second class citizens to equal status was 
considered as bid’at to the popular mind even if it stays within the boundaries of 
popular conservatism.
240
 The most general meaning of bid’at is innovation. However, 
its connotation in Islamic understanding is more significant. It is described as the 
innovative acts that are in contradiction with the advices and deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammed which are called as sunnah (sünnet). It is not an exact form of küfr 
(blasphemy, non-believing in Islam) but it denotes individual opposition and 
independence.
241
 Therefore, it is not welcomed by conservative societies. The idea of 
equality that came to minds with Gülhane Edict and openly declared by Reform Edict 
might be considered as a form of bid’at that violates the basic distinction and hierarchy 
in Islamic understating of a multi-religious state under Muslim rule.  However, it is 
more likely that elites rather than non-elites offended by the changes in Islamic 
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framework. Davison argues that equality idea came by the Edict might encounter 
opposition to innovation “not only among Muslim theologians but among the ruling 
group of empire who traditionally served faith and state, not state alone”.242  
The Muslim reactions could be examined on the symbolic basis. Scott 
investigates the ordinary “weapons of the weak” groups against the changes by the elite 
and reaches significant underlying factors. The dissent of Muslim groups were not took 
the form of an actual resistance in physical terms. The rebellions in the Ottoman Empire 
were mostly on the economic basis primarily over excessive taxation. However, the new 
perception brought by Tanzimat was not enough to turn into rebellion especially at this 
very beginning but it was enough powerful to have an influence over the firstly 
formation of the public opinion and development of the political culture towards a 
different direction that would affect the following years involving the years of 
Republican era. The significance of the public opinion lies here: it was also transferred 
to the following years in a cumulative manner and constitutes the core of the public 
reaction even the grand changes took place. Therefore, together with the concrete and 
historical events, symbolic and psychological factors should be taken into account. 
Regarding the confrontation with the authority and struggle between rich and poor, 
Scott argues that:  
“It is also a struggle over the appropriation of symbols, a struggle over how the 
past and present shall be understood and labeled, a struggle to identify causes 
and assess blame, a contentious effort to give partisan meaning to local history. 
The details of this struggle are not pretty, as they entail backbiting, gossip, 
character assassination, rude nicknames, gestures, and silences of contempt 
which, for the most part, are confined to the backstage of village.”243 
In Ottoman case, the identity and history which was at the stake for Muslims 
could be the Islamic and powerful empire which ruled over the inferior non-Muslims 
over centuries. For Muslims, it might be the case that there was a mutual value system 
in which a certain legal and social hierarchy was preserved but it was done within the 
state mentality of protection of its tebaa including non-Muslims. As it was seen in the 
earlier chapters, the administration of the non-Muslim tebaa was including an inferior 
position regarding the non-Muslims in comparison with Muslims. Yet, certain 
opportunities and rights were reserved for the non-Muslim tebaa and the protection was 
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granted through zimmet pact. It was also a part of the political culture of the empire and 
its subjects. It denoted a sum of values both in political and social levels. The reforms 
might be seen as a tool to violate the perception of past and present especially 
considering the position of the Ottoman Empire in international arena. At the societal 
level, since the non-Muslims are seemed to be advantageous thanks to the new political 
realities it might also became a symbolic crisis together with the material and legal 
changes. Some expressions in the reports are also verifying the likelihood of this 
perception. The critiques related to the clothing of the non-Muslims are an example. 
Clothing codes was not only a legal differentiation but also denoted symbolic order 
which was in line with the common value system of the Empire. Wearing clothes 
similar to Muslims or Europeans might be considered as annoying since they were 
against the shared rules of the society. It is not mentioned in the reports but the famous 
interpretation of the reforms is a remarkable indicator: “You shall not call an infidel as 
infidel anymore”.244 In line with the theorization of Scott, Muslim responses could be 
analyzed as the reaction to the betrayal of non-Muslims to shared value system and 
order. This interpretation requires an internalization of the pre-reform system and it is 
highly likely for Muslims since they were on the superior position. The following part 
will try to examine the source of this superiority perception.  
As it can be seen from the analysis of the spy reports that Muslim community is 
highly uncomfortable with developments in the Empire and position of the non-Muslim 
communities.  The studies on the literature refer to it as Muslims’ loss of superiority and 
status of millet-i hakime (the dominant group). The term is derived from the Islamic 
understanding of zimmet pact which was explained in earlier chapter. It is both clear and 
logical that the change of this kind of status is highly likely to produce dissident among 
the groups in question. However, is an Islamic perception enough to create such a 
dissident? Or in a more precise sense, without a political conditioning and reasoning 
behind it could it be that effective? In order to answer this question, mere historical 
analyses could not be suffice and one should turn into political theories without 
confining the research with time periodizations. This requires a closer look at the state-
society and inter-society relations. The notion of millet-i hakime shows itself more on 
the inter-society relations deriving its power from the state. It denotes a psychological 
supremacy and it become itself revealed over its loss. The zimmet pact includes a micro 
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form of hegemony of the Islamic state over the consent religious minorities that lives 
under its rule. To be brief, hegemony can be considered as domination of a particular 
social group over other social groups that do not only rely on force but mainly working 
through influence and consent. It denotes mass acceptance of prevailing social, cultural 
and moral values.
245
 
“The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways: as "domination" 
and as "intellectual and moral leadership"... A social group can, and indeed 
must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this 
indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it 
subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it 
firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well.”246  
 
Certain features of the power are not either visible or were not understood, 
researches has to use some social scientific tools to portray these hidden character of 
influence in terms of social structures and processes.
247
 For this study regarding the 
analysis of public reaction to the Tanzimat changes, a similar perspective has to be 
adopted. Therefore, firstly hegemonic character of Ottoman state should be indicated. It 
is not only in the legal sphere, the symbolic and cultural Islamic domination was also 
the case such as the dress code applied to non-Muslim groups or bans over the worship 
places. Even restriction of the bells of the churches could be included. In one of the 
reports, people in question were complaining about the church bells which indicated the 
continuation of symbolic problematization of upside down hierarchy. More importantly, 
consent was given to the state whether consciously or unconsciously. The domination 
part is clear in legal practices. The leadership of the Ottoman case comes from the idea 
of creating a legitimate and ultimate power base that does not leave any further room for 
questioning. Regarding the pre-modern times of the Empire the power base was more 
relied on the factor of force but when it confronted the internal and external threats the 
power base had to be changed through the reforms since the legitimation crisis was on 
the forefront. This denoted a shift in the hegemonic groups in the both state mechanism 
and society. The shifts in the state mechanism leaned towards the bureaucracy while the 
shifts in the society were much more gradually but it worried the groups who were in 
power at the societal level.  
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The power mentioned in here is not a one which was solely derived from the 
economic or political power as it can be seen in the cases of local notables (ayan). It is a 
one that operates on a micro-level as indicated by Foucault. The hegemonic standing of 
the state over other social groups is not only seen in this dimension but transferred into 
societal and inter-individual relations. The most concrete form is seen in the relations 
between majority and minorities. Each regime generates its own majority but the 
majority in here does not refer to a quantitative term. It has nothing to do with being 
numerically crowded. It is a qualitative term that if a social group at the societal level is 
able to exert power over the other segments of the society in both physical and 
psychological senses then that particular group could be referred as majority.  
Then, how does a particular social group becomes “the majority”?  The trick lies 
in the main ideology of the state. The ones who are in a compliance with the main 
ideology are able to perform hegemonic power over the ones who stayed outside this 
superior definitions and values. Inevitably, this power formation leads to an invisible 
asymmetrical power relation at the societal level. In Ottoman case, it refers to the 
Islamic understanding of superiority. It should be also noted that it being Muslim was 
not the only determining factor of the majority but considering the Ottoman case it the 
major characteristic to be possessed. Being Muslim or non-Muslim together with being 
part of the ruling class or being a subject was not the only qualities that determines 
one’s individual position but was also identified by other social, economic or political 
realities.
248
  
Muslims constituted the superior and hegemonic group in the Empire but only a 
potential threat to losing this superiority showed up with the Gülhane Edict, although it 
does not contain any clear equality promise, it led to aggression. They were in line with 
the main ideology of the Empire as the combination of Islamic main base together with 
the accepted inferiority of the non-Muslim groups and they were on the side of “the 
majority” for centuries. However, combination with the declining economic 
effectiveness and decrease in the political and social status produces the opinions that 
are seen in the reports. It not only Islamic driven process but includes power 
relationships at the societal level.  At the concerning period of time that gained its 
weight with the proclamation of Gülhane Edict would increase the tension over time it 
would reach its first peak with the Reform Edict since it prescribed a full equality 
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among Muslims and non-Muslims in legal and political sense. Its reflections on the 
societal level would be harsher since it became clear that the hegemonic majority 
position of Muslims which gained its power from the Islamic character of the state 
tended to be decrease. When the regime shifted with the Committee of Union and 
Progress at power, the majority-minority power dynamics in this framework changed 
and this regime created its own majority. The Republican Era was also a similar case 
with some additions and extractions on the identity of “the majority” but the essence 
stayed the same. The ones who are in conformity of the values and priorities formed the 
majority in both Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. When the regime was shaken 
and grand changes at the political level seemed to be a high potential in the eyes of the 
non-elites, they reacted to it with dissident and anger.  
The Gülhane Edict was not a direct threat to their position in actual manner; 
however for the non-elite Muslim segments of the society quite likely reacted on 
psychological terms combined with the material and historical “evidences” in their 
minds. The old winners of the game faced the possibility of to be the loser with the new 
reforms in psychological terms although this was on the micro-political level. This was 
the core of interpreting Tanzimat as an “invention”. In the eyes of Muslims, it was 
invented and it seemed not on the advantage of them this time. It is highly likely that 
when the individual could not express their dissident towards the state or its institutions 
or even state officials, it is easier to direct anger towards the ones who seems to be 
advantageous in this new order and blame them in many ways as it was seen in the 
reports.  
3.2 The Non-Muslim Reactions: “We Were Living in Peace, It Is All Frenk Plot!” 
The general and expected perception regarding the non-Muslim reactions to the 
Gülhane Edict is a positive one derived from the spy reports although there is no clear 
evidence concerning the non-Muslim public opinion. This is not surprising in a sense 
that considering the independence movements and general inclinations to Western 
superiority in both idea and material level. As indicated by İnalcık, Hamlin narrates the 
reactions of non-Muslims as “beginning of a new era” underlying with a clear 
optimism. He also mentions to fueling of national emotions in Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
The new arrangements were possibly interpreted as both increase in the non-Muslim 
rights and a new channel that may lead to separation from the empire. The relation 
between the separatist movements and great powers who act as guardians of the non-
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Muslim Ottoman population is also one of focus points in the analyses. The second 
possibility along with the relations with European powers is heavily underlined in the 
literature. However, the spy reports that will be studied in here argue the opposite. 
There is a clear dissident among the non-Muslim subjects of the empire regarding the 
European presence in the Ottoman lands especially in İstanbul.  
Priest Artin from Van states that  
“Being reaya in the Ottoman state is a blessing. Although there is oppression in 
some places; being the dog of the Great State (Devlet-i Aliyye’nin kelbi) is better 
than being reaya in the foreign countries.”249 
 There are two points regarding the expression here. Firstly, he makes a 
comparison between living under Ottoman and non-Ottoman rule. It can be clearly seen 
that living under a different rule than Ottoman is a possibility for reaya. However, the 
current sovereignty is considered as more plausible. Nevertheless, oppression in some 
territories is also mentioned. It can be also argued that this is a reflection of fear of 
uncertainty. Under the rule of Ottoman administration, a certain degree of certainty 
regarding the political landscape is preserved and with the declaration of Gülhane Edict 
the conditions seem to be meliorated, if the expression is taken within the boundaries of 
sincerity. Secondly, it is seen that living under an inferior position in a particular state 
was accepted and internalized. It can be interpreted as the result of zımmi status that was 
in effect for years. At this point, he does not consider living under a different state than 
Ottoman is unrealistic and accepts the inferior position rather than uncertainty. It does 
not reflect a “secessionist” tune as one might expect to see considering the general 
perception towards the non-Muslims in Turkish historiography. The general inclination 
in the official historiography is that non-Muslims were “the traitors” even at the 
beginning as a result of the dominant nationalist perception. Nevertheless, one has to be 
extremely cautious to make quick conclusions and generalizations. The nature of the 
spy reports complicates and limits the outlook that was needed; however, considering 
the fact that this is the early phase of the Tanzimat process the conclusions should not 
be made from the references of the future. Rather, the historical conjuncture had to be 
taken into account. The underlying reasons behind the opinions may be different and it 
will be analyzed later in this chapter.  
Hurşid Ağa tells about the discussions between non-Muslims in a house:  
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“A couple of reaya was talking in there and they were arguing that ‘our 
ancestors, our fathers and we were living in peace thanks to the Ottoman state. 
Now, foreigners leaked into our state and made it dependent to them. God shall 
help our state and we shall not fall into to the hands of another nation (cins-i 
aher)”.250 
What is remarkable in here is that these people were aware of the political 
developments and dominant discourses of the Empire. It falsifies the “static society” 
understanding of the Ottoman Empire. They might be directing their problems to the 
foreigners since they are the outsiders of a system that they were used to live in. In here 
again, it is seen a possibility to live under a different state that could be caused by two 
points. Firstly, they were aware of the secessionist movements in the Empire led by 
Greeks and Serbians. Hence, it is a possibility for all other religious or ethnic 
communities besides its practicability. Secondly, they might consider the economic 
dependency of the Ottoman Empire and see its relative weakness in first economic then 
political terms. “The Sick Man of the Europe” was known by public not as a direct term 
but as a condition felt by people. The nineteenth century public opinion was there, the 
degree and scope of it is open to question but they were most likely to aware of many 
political issues that the state was trying to manage. These can be seen in many other spy 
reports that are out of the scope of this study. Non-Muslims in this report also prefer 
Ottoman administration over the others.  
Greek middle man Kostandi argues that: 
“These British and French people stir up trouble that they tried to confuse and 
convince Greek population by showing holy books but head of our millet, the 
Patriarch, answered that three millets swore not to follow the books of the 
Europeans. Now, they are trying to stir up trouble the Ottoman. They are always 
trying to conspire. The reason behind the conflicts in Ottoman Empire is those 
Europeans.”251 
In here, it may be referred to the increasing missionary activities in the Ottoman 
Empire territory. In addition to the commercial protection of non-Muslim Ottoman 
subjects, European states were also presenting religious protection to the non-Muslim 
communities.
252
 In addition missionary activities were also significant in the nineteenth 
century. Ortaylı indicates that rather than the British Protestant missionaries, starting 
from the first Protestant missionary school opened by Americans in Beirut were 
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constantly proselytizing in Ottoman lands. They were criticized mostly by Ottoman 
non-Muslim communities rather than Ottoman administration. When the Ottoman 
officials recognize the complaints, they had to confront the British diplomats as the 
protectors of the American missionaries.
253
 What is mentioned in the reports could be a 
similar case. Most likely being Orthodox, Kostandi complaints about the activities. 
However, the remarkable point is that he interprets these activities as the plots against 
the Ottoman order and he blames the European interference as the cause of disturbance. 
It is also seen here that the European powers’ efforts to affect non-Muslim communities 
which is frequently emphasized in the literature. It was portrayed as non-Muslims are 
glad to have protectors apart from the Ottoman administration. However, this report can 
be an indicator of fragmented public opinion together with other reports regarding the 
foreigners issue.  
Dimitri from Kayseri states that  
“For a long time our property and honor are protected by the Great State and 
there is freedom as the subjects of the Ottoman state. I went to Büyükdere earlier 
day.  The British bothered me and wanted me to make a British citizen. I replied 
them that my all family was Ottoman and it is not convenient for us to go 
another country. They are offering this to anyone they saw.”254 
Here, again, affirmation of the rule of Ottoman state and consent to the 
administration is underlined. Protection and freedom could be interpreted as the results 
of zimmet pact practices and recent developments introduced by the Gülhane Edict. 
Another point is historical and family ties with the Ottoman state together with the 
possibility of living under a different administration. This also shows the inclination 
towards political certainty. He also argues that there is a clear persuasion acts from non-
Ottoman citizens and in this case it points to the British. These acts are related to the 
economic sphere. As it was indicated in the earlier chapters, with the nineteenth 
century, the Ottoman economy strengthened the economic relations with the world 
economy led by European economies and Ottoman markets became attractive for the 
European investors. However, this strengthening was not a balanced one. Not only for 
the Ottoman Empire but also applicable to Middle East in general, Kuran argues, this 
was combined with the economic underdevelopment of the region due to the lack of 
production or trade enterprises, inflexibility of the wakf system, lack of material 
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security.
255
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this comparison was made according to 
the advent of capitalism and “underdevelopment” should be considered within this 
framework. This led to an increasing foreign merchant population in the Empire. 
Kasaba indicates that nineteenth century onwards due to the tax reductions, decreasing 
government control, international protection and widening control sphere of jurisdiction 
rendered Western Anatolia as one of the most attractive and profitable regions in the 
Ottoman Empire for foreign merchants.
256
 This was also the case for the capital 
İstanbul. This was led to increasing role of the European industrialists, merchants and 
financiers together with the economic advances of local Christian and Jewish in relation 
to Muslim population mainly over the trade and sectors of banking and insurance.
257
 
Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 removed many of the barriers in the way of 
European merchants although “it was a continuation of the already established path of 
economic liberalism set in 1826”.258 Regarding their relations with the non-Muslim 
subjects of the Empire, beratlı system is also significant. Through obtaining a special 
exemption licenses from the Ottoman central administration, non-Muslim subjects of 
the Empire could be subjected to European law. They would have the same privileges 
that foreign merchants gained through the applications of capitulations. Beratlı could 
have a privileged status that the rest of the reaya could not obtain especially for the 
commercial issues.
259
 The non-Muslims who could benefited from the berat system 
were mainly dragomans (translators who were working for foreign ambassadors and 
consuls) and their sons and servants, warehousemen (mahzenci) and brokers (simsar) 
who were needed by foreign merchants for specialized guidance in Ottoman 
commercial structure, moneychangers (sarraf) and servants of ambassadors and 
consuls.
260
 The crucial reason behind the attractiveness of this system for non-Muslims 
was firstly tax exemptions such as harac, avarız, kassabiye and tekalif-i örfiye and 
secondly low custom taxes. However, it is only one of the choices that non-Muslim 
merchants could use if they want. The second one is to obtain a European passport 
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through becoming a European subject who could use economic privileges. It was a 
relatively easy procedure and some consulates actively encouraged Ottoman subjects to 
change their allegiances.
261
 This report shows a dissident related to the issue although 
reliability is open to the question. Nevertheless, the ever-mounting presence of the 
European powers and increasing interactions with the non-Muslim population is line 
with these reports. It is not only direct European interference but also a potential sector 
related to these issues was also documented in one of the reports as following by İspiro 
from Nemçe: 
 “If somebody from reaya comes to me and asks to be under another flag with 
passport from any country he wants, I can get the passport and made the flag for 
his ship. Recently, an Armenian came to me and I provided him a Wallachian 
passport included everything and showed at customs bureau with the help of a 
translator. Armenian person gave me three thousand guruş and I provide the 
same thing for anyone who comes to me.”262 
  In the nineteenth century, the economic position of the non-Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire points to an advantageous condition. Keyder indicates that:  
“By the end of the nineteenth century, cities and towns in Anatolia were 
prospering, with especially the port cities exhibiting rapid rates of population 
growth. Here, in the growing cities, a Greek and Armenian middle class 
emerged, wealthy, educated and active in attempting to define the urban public 
space of associations, clubs and publications; and increasingly willing to 
participate in the administration of the Provinces and the Empire. This group 
became the nascent bourgeoisie of the Empire.”263 
It was not surprising; however, the inter-communal relations were affected by 
these economic dynamics. As Çizakça and Kenanoğlu state, being a protégé or a subject 
of European powers is hard for non-Muslim merchants as opposed to the non-Muslim 
counterparts. There was a certain need for European businessmen to have middlemen to 
conduct business in Ottoman markets but for these middlemen to be Muslim was not 
possible due to the reluctance of both Europeans and Muslims to cooperate in economic 
terms.
264
 Although Muslim merchants were forming the majority in economic sphere 
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they were deprived of these advantages and this must have led an increasing tension 
between the inter-communal relations.
265
 This part focused upon the socio-economic 
dynamics that could play a role in the non-Muslim public opinion formation derived 
from the spy reports. Although the economic position of them in the Empire drives one 
to be much sharper regarding their opinions towards Ottoman center and Muslim 
communities, the reports are showing a much more different case. The following 
section will be reserved to the underlying causes of the non-Muslim reactions based 
upon the spy reports at the micro-political level.  
3.2.1 The Potential Causes of the Non-Muslim Reactions 
“There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the 
strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.”266 The analysis of the non-Muslim 
reactions over the spy reports that are examined in this study has to take “silences” into 
account. What clearly derived from the reports is the consent and contentment from the 
Ottoman rule in contrast with the clear dissidence perceived from the reports of the 
Muslims. Nevertheless, the silences are hidden in the discourses that are revealed 
consciously or unconsciously. The examination of the spy reports reveals declared 
opinions and the socio-economic and political reasoning behind the reactions were 
indicated in the former part of this study. However, psychological dimension should 
also be at least tried to examine regarding the general political landscape and the state 
mentality behind the Gülhane Edict. As indicated earlier, it is not possible to have a 
conclusive argument over the reasons behind these reflected opinions but a few 
possibilities will be investigated in this part.  
First of all, before going into the micro-level political opinions one point should 
also be mentioned. The information presented in the reports was transmitted to the 
central administration through an agency. This creates limitation over the content of the 
reports. The problem is that spy as the agency was not copying the conversations of the 
people directly; rather he was making a summary of a potential long speech in a 
paragraph. It brings the possibility of omitting some parts of the dialogues on the basis 
of spy’s priorities or choices. To illustrate, if there were some dissident expressed by 
non-Muslims towards the process of Tanzimat or inclination for foreign protection or 
even open support for secessionist movements, this would be also problematic for the 
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narration of the spy as well. If there were any kind of these opinions, these would be in 
a direct contradiction of the one of the purposes of Tanzimat which is increasing loyalty 
to the state. The spies might also refrain from the heavy load of “bad news”.  However, 
it is very less likely that they would make direct manipulations over the reports. The 
expressions and phrases in the reports are most likely to be original ones.  
The problem related to the interpretation of the reports is that level of sincerity is 
open to question since non-Muslims may not express their real thoughts freely. A few 
reasons may be given. Firstly, they might refrain from the reactions of the Muslims or 
society as a whole. Due to the reasons explained in other parts of this thesis which are 
varying from secessionist movements in the empire to the Muslim dissident towards 
new political developments, it was probably not easier for them to express themselves 
in real terms. Another reason could be the possibility that they might realize that they 
were being spied. The spy represents the state in this context and accordingly the 
political authority that they were subjected to. The possibility that “state may hear you” 
is a dangerous position for any subject of a state regardless of their status. Although the 
reporting mechanism of the state at the time was not based on finding and punishing 
those who are talking about the state, statements in some reports such as the existence 
of spies in disguise or prohibition of the political conversations shows that these risks 
were taken seriously by the people.
267
 Therefore, they might change their opinions 
respectively as it is seen in the reports. They were insisting in the reports that they were 
blessed by living under the Ottoman rule. Kuran conceptualizes this condition as 
“preference falsification”. He describes the situation as “the act of misrepresenting 
one’s genuine wants under perceived social pressures”.268 In this case, both the potential 
social pressure and the possibility of being under the watch of political authority might 
tend them to hide their personal truths. They might be supporting secessionist 
movements, supporting the European presence in both political and economic senses or 
they might not comfortable with the policies of the Ottoman rule. However, choosing 
the preference falsification option seems to be “less dangerous”. Social pressure is also 
important since they are living together. In one of the reports, a Muslim man, Hurşit 
Ağa, narrates the opinions of a non-Muslim group. The group might purposively falsify 
their preferences because of the presence of a Muslim. One might have to choose 
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between inner and outer peace
269
 and in this case this crucial choose might lead to 
problems that may end in ordinary violence. Regarding the analysis of the non-Muslim 
public opinion formation, the political and social conditions should also be taken into 
account. However, as it was stated in the very beginning it is not possible to have clear 
conclusions regarding the issue.  
 Along with the silences that can be highly meaningful, the potential sincerity in 
the reports should also be considered in order to avoid biased conclusions. Although 
Muslim opinions are more likely to be considered within the framework of sincerity due 
to the conditions and clear anger that they express, regarding non-Muslim opinions this 
was not the case. The former part was reserved possibilities in other way around. This 
part will point to the second option that is they express their opinions sincerely and the 
possible reasoning behind them.  
Although the non-Muslims displays dissent to the European presence and 
appraisal for the current regime, in addition to the possible causes at the socio-political 
and individual level, the most likely reason that shaped the reactions is the political 
uncertainty that the Empire and its population was facing. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 
argue that there is a simple relationship between uncertainty and conservatism.
270
 In this 
sense, non-Muslim reactions could be regarded within the framework of depending on 
values and political structure that was lived under for generations besides the 
problematic sides. Some of the reports underline their long term family ties lived under 
Ottoman administration. It is clear that something important was changing but the 
direction is blurred. As the relatively disadvantaged parts of the Empire, the non-
Muslims do not have the luxury to decide its side at this point.  
Emphasize on “plots of Frenks” in the Ottoman Empire is also an important 
point in the reports that are mentioned frequently and it is closely related to the political 
uncertainty possibly felt by non-Muslims. The people whom the spies were reporting 
their conversations are targeting non-Ottoman people as “plotters” who work on the 
behalf of European countries led by Britain and France in order to implicating the 
Ottoman state. Groh argues that people constantly fall within the situations that they no 
cannot understand and make sense of the world around them in a clear manner. These 
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kinds of crisis situations led to the birth of conspiracies. Many great conspiracies around 
the world and throughout the history rise from crises when people were not able to give 
meaning to the new realities. The examples vary from witch-hunt in the late middle ages 
to conspiracies related to French Revolution of 1789 and to even today spring from the 
crises that the society was experiencing.
271
 In non-Muslim Ottoman communities case 
two points can be made. Firstly, although the situation that the Ottoman society was 
living in is not a crisis it was definitely a crisis-prone environment with respect to the 
political climate both domestically and internationally examined in the first chapter of 
this work. Secondly, in this complex condition, the non-Muslim may have the urge the 
change the potential targeting and blaming from themselves to “outsiders” who were 
definitely not welcomed by Muslims as well. On the one hand, they were connecting 
themselves to the historical bonds with the Ottoman Empire; on the other hand they 
were most likely trying to misdirect potential blame over the foreigners. At the heart of 
this self-positioning, hegemonic inter-communal structure lies. The political, legal and 
finally social inferiority at the micro-political level might incline them to react in this 
manner. Ottomanism policy, as indicated in the second chapter of this work, tried to 
construct a new main ideology of the state in which non-Muslims incorporate 
themselves and elude from the inferior minority position first in political then in social 
sense. However, in addition to the relatively failure of the doctrine in practical sense 
especially for inter-communal relations, it was not enough to compensate and fill the 
cracks of the old value system in which Muslims constituted “the majority”. The old 
hegemonic system started to fail in the context of having the consent of the minorities 
together with the many other political developments that are influential to shape the 
dynamics mentioned in earlier chapters. Accordingly, tensions and changing demands 
from non-Muslims started to be more effective on the communities. These tensions 
constituted a significant part of the Ottoman Empire’ dissolution process.  However, 
regarding the reactions after the Gülhane Edict, these could only be considered as one 
of the inception points rather than a peak.  
As indicated before, Gülhane Edict did not bring any significant change to both 
political and social realms. Nevertheless, structural value system based on Islamic 
superiority and political culture of the Empire perceived this edict as a “threat”. This 
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was a joint perception shared by elites and non-elite Muslims at the same time and 
affected historians as well. This illusional tension became concrete when the Reform 
Edict was proclaimed with its statements regarding non-Muslims as pointed out earlier. 
Nonetheless, a clear tendency in Turkish official historiography as well as some 
scholars targets the non-Muslims as the ones who were always tried to break up their 
bonds with the empire. This is a biased perspective colored with a nationalist narrative. 
As Gürpınar argues, “this narrative perceives the developments of the late Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish War of Independence (1918–22) not as belonging to a unique 
historical context, but as an episode in an enduring and eternal struggle”.272 It combines 
Europeans collaborating with non-Muslims in the Empire regarding their commercial 
relations with them and creates “common enemies”. A closer look to the reports and a 
detailed analyses points to the existence of a fragmented public opinion with respect to 
the concerned period
273
 and suggest researchers to have a cautious standing with respect 
to these issues in order to have an accurate viewpoint.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Understanding and analyzing a certain political phenomenon requires the 
combination of examining of both diplomatic and social history. Through integrating 
the issues and features, the state-society relations in a certain period of time which has 
indisputable effects can be revealed. Intra-societal relations and as well as the relations 
of individuals with state with respect to political and legal senses should be examined 
and combined with the diplomatic history to complete the story and have a fruitful 
insight.  
The aim of this thesis has been shaped around this perception. There are 
numerous valuable studies regarding the Tanzimat era which approach the issues from a 
diplomatic, economic or international angles. They provided accurate analyses and 
fruitful discussions that enlighten our perspective of this significant period of the 
Ottoman Empire. There are also studies related to Ottoman society in concerning era 
which focused on the different territories of the Empire as well as İstanbul with a 
special reference to societal relations. Accordingly, this thesis meant to investigate 
societal dynamics further on the basis of this literature through working on special case 
studies of spy reports in İstanbul. Its research question was based on the reactions given 
by non-elite segments of the Ottoman society upon the Tanzimat and its reforms 
particularly focusing on the Muslim and non-Muslim relations of the era. It aimed to 
contribute to the Tanzimat studies for further research and discussion from the 
perspective of social history combined with diplomatic history. In this sense, it proposes 
the necessity of building a bridge between state and society with emphasizing over the 
relations of the communities at the daily level.  
In line with the abovementioned methodology, firstly the Gülhane Edict and 
Reform Edict were analyzed together with the debates that take place in the literature. 
As steps in the modernization period of the Ottoman Empire recognizing that the empire 
was already on the way of this process, it could be argued that the elites of the Gülhane 
Edict worked on a relatively different path of modernization for Ottoman Empire. 
Analyzing this Edict and the repercussions of it only from the lens of Westernization is 
highly problematic and it creates danger in terms of producing Orientalist outlooks that 
harms our insight. Nevertheless, both internal and external pressures were influential to 
change the direction from this somewhat alternative modernization to a more 
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Westernized understanding of modernization. The Reform Edict, in contrast to Gülhane 
Edict, was the product of this mentality. At this point, Ottoman elites themselves 
adopted a self-orientalist position and formed their policies according to this point of 
view. However, it should be also noted that Gülhane Edict did not bring radical changes 
for both Muslim and non-Muslim relations and equality and the other spheres that it 
mentioned. It should be considered within this framework. On the other hand, the 
Reform Edict was changing the rules of the game. It brought the principle of equality 
among Muslims and non-Muslims in many spheres vary from state officialdom to the 
education.  
 In the light of these, then, how did the non-elites react to these changes? What 
were the basic dynamics that shaped their perspective? An examination of the spy 
reports separately for the communities revealed many interesting points that are open to 
discussion. To begin with, although there was nothing new in the Gülhane Edict in both 
theoretical and practical sense, they consider the promises in it as “invention”. There are 
few possibilities behind this perception although the text proposes a restoration in 
essence. In addition, Muslims in all of the reports that are relevant reveals a clear anger 
towards Tanzimat and non-Muslims. Firstly, Muslims might consider the reforms as 
bid’at (innovation in Islam) but it is most likely to affect the reactions and the basis of 
argumentation for ulama rather than the people.  It is argued in this thesis that the key 
dynamics of the reactions lies in the psychological basis considering the fact that 
Gülhane Edict did not bring grand changes. The first glance points to the grand political 
changes that were beginning the surface as in the case of secessionist movements and 
increasing rate of economic activities of the non-Muslims. These events might provide 
the material basis of the Muslim reactions. In addition to the material basis, the negative 
reactions might be reinforced by the symbolic order and the possibility that it was 
broken. As indicated in the legal administration of non-Muslims, zimmet pact reinforced 
by other legal regulations frames the relations between state and non-Muslims and it has 
inevitable repercussions over the communal relations. It creates a shared value system 
by the all segments of the society with providing Muslims a relatively superior status as 
millet-i hakime. At the first symbolic level, the combination of secessionist movements 
and economic cooperation with the Europeans might be perceived as “betrayal” to the 
shared values of the Ottoman system. Regarding the millet-i hakime understanding, this 
thesis argues that the core of the perception lies in the micro-political relations. The 
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ideological and legal structure of the Ottoman regime creates its own “majority” in 
qualitative sense and Muslims as the ones who are in line with the hegemonic value 
system consider themselves to be superior at the societal level. This perception requires 
inferior status of the non-Muslims accordingly and influences the daily interactions. The 
Gülhane Edict does not explicitly state equality but it might be considered as a threat to 
their superior status. This is a psychological transformation rather than reacting on 
concrete basis. The Edict indicates that there might be concrete and radical changes in 
the future course of events and this expectation was verified by the Reform Edict. 
Hence, this thesis suggests symbolic power and micro-political analysis for the 
examination of the reactions and public opinion formation for further research rather 
than macro-political analyses that take the transformation of perceptions in the society 
as granted.  
 For the non-Muslim reactions, the situation is more complex. Non-Muslims in 
the reports express blessing for Ottoman state and they blame the foreigners in the 
Empire for interrupting and problems experienced by both state and society. Leaving 
aside the problematic nature of the reports, studies should approach the reports from 
two main angles. If the reports considered as documents that hide some silences behind 
these expressions, it may be interpreted as the products of preference falsification as a 
tool to avoid from reactions of state and Muslims. However, this study argues that they 
might be a result of sincere reactions to the political uncertainty that they were living in. 
There was nothing precise about directions of change and expecting clear-cut opinions 
as Muslims have is not realistic for non-Muslims. Rather, directing their dissident 
towards foreigners who are outside the system is safer for them. Biased conclusions 
regarding the non-Muslim public opinion should be avoided. The historical conjuncture 
of the era has to be carefully taken into account for non-Muslim opinion analysis 
together with the micro-political analysis tools. Otherwise, it would only serve to the 
nationalist arguments based on “betrayal of the non-Muslims at the very beginning”. As 
Hobsbawm argues, history is the essential element of the nationalist, ethnic or 
fundamentalist ideologies and if there is no past suitable for these ideologies it can be 
easily invented.
274
 This study hopes to propose points and arguments for further 
research and discussion in order to shed a light upon Tanzimat era and for “the silent” 
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segments of the Ottoman society whose names were not known but highly significant 
for our understanding of the Ottoman history.  
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